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Impeachable Offenses?

~ Examining the Case for Removal of the 45th President of the United States

Impeachable Offenses?

Tag Archives: unindicted co-conspirator

More on Mueller’s Endgame: Unindicted Co-Conspirators & Other Stuff

01 Thursday Feb 2018

Posted by impeachableoffenses in Uncategorized

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Leon Jaworski, Mueller, nixon, Nixon impeachment, Robert Mueller, unindicted co-conspirator

By Frank Bowman

Under current Department of Justice policy, Special Counsel Robert Mueller is not empowered to seek an indictment against a sitting president. Yesterday, I discussed here and on Slate two ways Mueller could nonetheless ensure that Congress would be informed if he concluded that Mr. Trump had committed crimes.

Several colleagues and commenters on the blog have raised questions that may have occurred to others.  I try to answer them below:

Uninidicted co-conspirators: A colleague remembered that President Richard Nixon was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in a case brought by Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski He wondered whether that might provide an avenue for disclosing Mr. Mueller’s conclusions and the evidence supporting them. It could. Theoretically. But the reason I didn’t mention this option is that listing unindicted co-conspirators by name in an indictment has been sharply criticized by courts and is strongly discouraged by Department of Justice policy. Formally identifying someone as a criminal without formally charging him imposes a damaging public stigma without a mechanism for removing it. Therefore, the general rule is that, if prosecutors have sufficient evidence to charge someone with a crime, they should do so, which both triggers their obligation to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt and gives the person named an opportunity to defend himself.

Accordingly, Section 9-11.130 of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual states: “In the absence of some significant justification, federal prosecutors generally should not identify unindicted co-conspirators in conspiracy indictments.”

Jaworski evidently felt that naming Nixon was justifiable, presumably for reasons that would appeal to Mr. Mueller, such as a desire to avoid the complications entailed by indicting a sitting president, while at the same time letting Congress and the public know about his legal judgment that Nixon had committed a crime.  Mueller might come to feel the same way. However, while Jaworski seems to have enjoyed a substantial amount of operational freedom due to the firestorm that resulted from the firing of his predecessor Archibald Cox in the infamous Saturday Night Massacre, it’s pretty plain that any decision by Mueller that directly touches on Mr. Trump is going to be carefully scrutinized by his DOJ superior.  That superior (whether it is Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein or someone thrust into that role by Mr. Trump’s evident desire to fire him) could easily justify refusing to allow Mueller to name Mr. Trump as an unindicted co-conspirator on the ground that it violated DOJ policy and was not supported by a “significant justification.”

To be clear, if Mr. Mueller concludes that Mr. Trump conspired with others to commit crimes, he can certainly draft indictments of those others, and structure his case against them, in a way that makes Mr. Trump’s wrongdoing fairly clear without naming him as a co-conspirator.  In the end, that is perhaps the easiest way for Mueller to proceed.  However, that approach necessarily saves Mr. Trump from two legally and politically important events — the formal and public judgment by Mr. Mueller, expressed in his signature on an indictment, that Mr. Trump committed a crime, and the formal and public conclusion by a grand jury of ordinary citizens, expressed by approving the indictment, that Mr. Trump probably committed that crime. Leon Jaworski named Richard Nixon precisely because he appreciated the significance of these solemn pronouncements.

Reader questions: Tye Simpson asks: “How do you square the special counsel’s congressional authority in section [609](c) to prosecute if there’s no authority to indict? In the event of conflict shouldn’t a general departmental policy or practice be subordinated to a specific congressional authority?”

The key is the reader’s characterization of Mueller’s authority to prosecute as “congressional authority.”  It’s not.  The regulation I referred to in yesterday’s post is an internal Department of Justice regulation, not a congressionally authorized statute.  And the regulation, 28 CFR 600.6, merely gives Mueller the same authority granted the U.S. Attorney in a federal judicial district.  Like all U.S. Attorneys, Mueller is subject to DOJ regulations and the DOJ chain of command.  The regulations give Mueller’s superiors the power to bar him from doing things that are contrary to DOJ policy.  Indicting a sitting president is against DOJ policy.  Therefore, Mueller’s superior, now Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein, can prevent Mueller from doing it.

Tye Simpson also asks: “For a non-lawyer: What about: 600.9 (c) “The Attorney General may determine that public release of these reports would be in the public interest, to the extent that release would comply with applicable legal restrictions…”? Currently, R. Rosenstein’s call?”

The reader refers to the DOJ regulation governing disclosure to Congress and the public of reports on instances when higher DOJ authority blocks a special counsel from pursuing some action he wants to pursue.  The short answer to the question is “yes.”  That is, if Mueller recommended indicting Mr. Trump and was ordered not to do it, the Justice Department would be obliged to report that event and the reasons for it to Congress.  That’s the provision I’ve suggested Mueller could use to force disclosure to Congress of a conclusion that Mr. Trump committed a crime.  Disclosure to Congress in those circumstances is not optional.

However, the section to which the reader alludes, 28 CFR 609(c), governs disclosure to the public.  And those disclosures are discretionary.  In this case, the discretion would presumably be exercised by Rod Rosenstein.

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Obstruction of justice matters only in an impeachment inquiry

05 Friday Jan 2018

Tags

nixon, obstruction, Obstruction of Justice, Robert Mueller, rosenstein, unindicted co-conspirator

For the past several days, the media has been ablaze with stories touting new details of Mr. Trump’s concern about the Russia investigation and his alleged efforts to quash it.  For example, Mr. Trump apparently believed that Attorney General Sessions could control the investigation and shield Mr. Trump, and therefore sought to prevent Sessions from recusing himself by sending White House counsel Donald McGahn to lobby Sessions against recusal.  Other bits and pieces are solidifying the proposition that Trump fired Comey in order to stop or impede the Russia investigation.

Unsurprisingly, many commentators have been declaring one or the other of these revelations definitive proof that Mr. Trump is guilty of obstruction of justice. The purpose of this post is not to assess the current state of the evidence.  Rather, I want to re-emphasize several points I made last summer:

1) While it is quite possible (contrary to the ill-considered declarations of folks like Alan Dershowitz) for a president to commit the crime of obstruction of justice, the official position of the Department of Justice is that a sitting president may not be criminally indicted.  Robert Mueller, whose appointment makes him subject to DOJ rules and regulations and subordinate to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, has no authority to disregard that DOJ position.  Accordingly, no matter what evidence Mr. Mueller uncovers, it is vanishingly unlikely that he would even attempt to indict Mr. Trump for obstruction.

2) Even if Mr. Trump were indicted and convicted of obstruction, such a conviction would not result in his removal from office.  Only impeachment can accomplish that end.  Only Congress can impeach and remove a president.  And therefore the real question is what Congress will choose to do with whatever Mr. Mueller uncovers. But before it could do anything, it would have to have access to Mueller’s results.

3) Absent a formal indictment, the most Mueller could do in the criminal context is name Mr. Trump as an unindicted co-conspirator in an indictment charging others with obstruction.  This was the tack taken against Richard Nixon by Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworsky, but it was controversial at the time and is disfavored by DOJ policy.  We cannot predict with any certainty whether Mueller might try this approach, or whether Deputy A.G. Rosenstein would approve it.  Should Trump be named as an unindicted co-conspirator, that designation would formalize a legal conclusion by the Mueller prosecution team and give that conclusion a grand jury’s stamp of approval.  Critically, in the course of litigating the case against those formally indicted, the facts regarding Mr. Trump’s involvement would be revealed.

4)  If Mueller’s team assembles a convincing case that Mr. Trump did commit the crime of obstruction of justice, but is unwilling either to indict him or name him as an unindicted co-conspirator, there is some uncertainty about whether, and if so how, Mueller’s conclusions and supporting evidence would become available to anyone outside the Justice Department. Ordinarily, out of concern for the privacy interests of persons not charged, the Department does not disclose the facts of investigations that don’t result in charges.  James Comey’s choice to discuss publicly the details of the Clinton e-mail investigation was contrary to DOJ policy and would have been a perfectly sound reason to fire him — if it had been the real reason. Moreover, DOJ regulations on the appointment of special counsel make no provision for reports to congress or the public.

All that being said, there is little, if any, doubt that a committee of the House of Representatives engaging in an impeachment inquiry could request, and if necessary subpoena, Mueller’s materials and secure his testimony about his conclusions.  But, as I have observed before, no such inquiry is at all likely to occur so long as Republicans control the House.  Only if Democrats flip at least the House of Representatives will any of this chatter about presidential obstruction of justice have any practical consequence.

Frank Bowman

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Frank O. Bowman, III


Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law
University of Missouri School of Law

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