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Greitens’ Criminal Case Dismissed: Be Careful What You Wish For…

14 Monday May 2018

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By Frank Bowman

Never a dull moment here in Missouri.  This afternoon brings the news that, on the third day of jury selection, St. Louis Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner has moved to dismiss the invasion of privacy prosecution against Governor Eric Greitens.  This is, at least in theory, what is a called a dismissal without prejudice, meaning that the case can be refiled.  And Ms. Gardner says she will seek to refile.

The stated reason for the dismissal is that the defense named Ms. Gardner as a defense witness, and the trial judge allowed them to do so.  Ms. Gardner claims that she cannot proceed with the trial in a situation where her subordinates would be in the position of cross-examining her.

Ms. Gardner says she is considering either seeking a special prosecutor to handle the case or refiling and asking one of her assistants to lead the prosecution.

I haven’t yet thought through the validity of Ms. Gardner’s assertions about her ethical position.  I may have some thoughts on that later.

For the moment, I have a sneaking suspicion that Governor Greitens’ trial team has been too clever by half, at least if their objective is to preserve Mr. Greitens in the governor’s office.  My own necessarily tentative assessment of the invasion of privacy criminal case has been that it’s a very tough one for the prosecution in the absence of the photograph, or at least forensic evidence that a photograph once existed.  From what can be gleaned from press reports, the government had neither the picture nor any circumstantial forensic evidence. Thus, the state’s entire case rested on the credibility of the victim, who, according to her own statement, was blindfolded at the time the supposed picture was taken. And the state had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and secure votes of guilty from every juror.

Therefore, while the state could have won (and may yet win) this trial based purely on a favorable jury assessment of the victim’s credibility, my money would have been on an acquittal or at most a hung jury.  Politically, either is a great outcome for Greitens.

But the aggressiveness of trial counsel has just deprived the governor of a reasonably likely legal win.  Instead, the criminal trial will either never happen or will be delayed for months by further legal wrangling.  In the meantime, the action shifts to the legislature’s special impeachment session, where the governor is saddled by multiple handicaps:

  • The charges in the legislature probably won’t be limited to invasion of privacy, with the inherent weakness of the absence of the photo.  As noted in an earlier post, if one believes the former mistress victim, Mr. Greitens also arguably committed one or more forms of felony sexual assault.  And, of course, there are now allegations of campaign finance violations.
  • Even if the impeachment case were limited to allegations about Mr. Greitens’ encounters with his mistress, the report of the House special committee on that matter indicates plainly that the committee members unanimously believe her, not him.
  • The burden of proof in impeachment is lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of criminal cases.  And those seeking impeachment don’t need a unanimous verdict.
  • The legislators, even in Greitens’ own party, seem not to like him.  The Republicans in particular plainly think he is a political millstone.  And unlike jurors, they can’t be challenged for political bias or for prejudging the case.

It sure looks to me like the governor’s lawyers have outsmarted themselves.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 11 (More on suspension after impeachment)

09 Wednesday May 2018

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By Frank Bowman

Jason Hancock, a diligent reporter from the Kansas City Star, alerted me to a Missouri constitutional provision that kicks up even more dust on the question of whether Governor Greitens could be suspended from office following impeachment by the House, but before conviction by the panel of seven “eminent jurists” appointed by the Senate.

Article IV, Section 11(a) of the Missouri constitution states:

On the death, conviction or impeachment, or resignation of the governor, the lieutenant governor shall become governor for the remainder of the term.

Candidly, this language is almost impenetrable.

It says that the Lt. Gov takes over for “the remainder of the term” upon “the death, conviction or impeachment, or resignation of the governor.”  But it is entirely unclear about what “conviction or impeachment” means.  “Impeachment” could mean just a vote by the House on articles of impeachment, which is usually the technical meaning of that term.  But that can’t be right in this context because that would mean that the Lt. Gov. becomes the governor, and stays governor until the end of the term, as soon as the House votes and regardless of what the judges do.

Which leads one to think that the drafters intended “impeachment” in this context to mean completion of the whole process – the House vote and then the “eminent jurist” vote.

But if so, that leaves unexplained the word “conviction” in the odd phrase “conviction or impeachment.”  Does conviction here refer solely to the impeachment setting and thus to the verdict of the eminent jurists?  That would make logical sense, but it makes no grammatical sense because of the word “or” connecting conviction with impeachment.  In other words, one cannot have an impeachment conviction without first having a House impeachment vote, but one can have a separate criminal conviction regardless of whether there is an impeachment proceeding.

In which case, does conviction refer to some kind of conviction independent of an impeachment proceeding?  But that makes no sense because the term “conviction” doesn’t seem to have a definition.  Presumably, outside of the impeachment context it would have to refer to a criminal conviction.  But absent any other qualifier, it would include every kind and degree of criminal conviction from murder to jaywalking.  And that can’t be right.

Here’s my best guess:  The sensible way to read this is that the governor stays governor until the impeachment process – House vote and judge vote – produces a final result.  At which point, if the governor is impeached and convicted, the Lt. Governor takes over as governor for the remainder of the governor’s term.  But this sensible reading is not necessarily required by the text.

In addition, as explained in my last post, the governor could be suspended from exercising his official powers in the interval between the House impeachment vote and judicial vote on the articles of impeachment if the “eminent jurists” vote to suspend him.  Presumably, the Lt. Governor would take over the powers of governor during the suspension, to return them if the governor were acquitted, but keep them until the end of the governor’s term if the governor were convicted.

 

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor edition, Part 10 (Suspension after impeachment)

09 Wednesday May 2018

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By Frank Bowman

I have been asked by several media outlets about what happens in the period after a state official is impeached by the House of Representatives, but before the matter is tried by the “seven eminent jurists” appointed by the Senate.  So here’s the scoop:

There is a Missouri statute that purports to automatically suspend a state officer upon impeachment by the House, RSMO 106.050.  However, in a 1994 decision involving the impeachment of Missouri Secretary of State Judith Moriarty, the Missouri Supreme Court found that suspension cannot be automatic.  Rather, the judges charged with trying the impeachment can, but need not, vote to suspend the impeached officer during pendency of the impeachment proceedings.

To be candid, I find this decision quite peculiar.  The statute is plainly meant to mandate automatic suspension.  It makes no reference to a discretionary choice by the judiciary panel charged with trying impeachments. Nor does it state or imply that some kinds of impeachable offenses merit suspension while others do not. Yet the Moriarty decision necessarily means that there are suspendable and non-suspendable offenses, and does so without specifying how one would tell the difference.

Some indication of the court’s thinking on the latter point can be gleaned from this passage in the opinion:

Here, the offense alleged went to a claim of misconduct regarding the core responsibilities of the office of the Secretary of State, certification of a candidate for public office. Here, also, a general election was scheduled to occur prior to the trial of impeachment. The charges cast doubt as to the ability of Ms. Moriarty to properly carry out her supervisory responsibilities. There was no possibility of clearing away that doubt until after Ms. Moriarty’s impeachment trial was completed. This was a matter of such unique importance and sensitivity that suspension pending trial was required to uphold the sanctity of our election process.

The court seems to say that suspension is warranted in a case where the nature of the charges “cast[s] doubt as to the ability of [an officeholder] to properly carry out” the responsibilities of office.  But that is, at best, a political judgment, and a highly speculative one at that.  Yet this is the same court that in its later decision convicting and removing Secretary of State Moriarty piously declared that, “this Court must assume that our role is as a court, not as a substitute political body.”

Regardless, for the present it appears that, should Governor Greitens be impeached, he would continue to exercise his gubernatorial powers until such time as the panel of eminent jurists appointed by Senate voted to suspend him.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 9 (Still more on pre-office conduct)

04 Friday May 2018

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By Frank Bowman

Regular readers will recall that former Missouri Chief Justice Michael Wolff and I have disagreed about whether Governor Eric Greitens can be impeached for conduct that occurred before he took office.  Judge Wolff said no.  I said yes.

One of Judge Wolff’s arguments was that there had been no impeachments of federal officers for conduct prior to assumption of office.  I responded, in part, that federal practice is irrelevant to Missouri constitutional rules because the standards for impeachment are markedly different in the U.S. and Missouri constitutions.  But I concurred with Judge Wolff’s assertion that no federal official had been impeached for pre-office conduct.

Both of us were wrong.  In an op-ed in today’s New York Times, Congressman Adam Schiff recalls his experience as a member of the House Judiciary Committee in 2010 when it voted to recommend impeachment of  U.S. District Judge Thomas Porteous.  He notes that one of the articles of impeachment approved by the House and later the Senate alleged corrupt behavior while Porteous was a state judge and before he took the federal bench.

As Congressman Schiff observed, “In voting overwhelmingly to convict Judge Porteous on every count, the Senate established the precedent that a federal official can be removed for conduct committed before assuming office.”

Precedent in federal impeachment is a peculiar animal.  The process lies entirely within the province of Congress, and is generally agreed not to be reviewable by the courts. Therefore, the legal principle of stare decisis — meaning that earlier decisions of appellate courts have some binding effect on judges in later cases — doesn’t apply to federal impeachments.  Each new congress can interpret the impeachment language of the constitution however it chooses, regardless of what previous congresses may have done.  That said, congressmen have tended to look at prior impeachment decisions as guides to appropriate constitutional interpretation.  Therefore, it seems quite likely that the Porteous case will be seen as establishing a meaningful precedent.

This may be of some modest consequence in the case of Governor Greitens.  The standard for impeachment under the Missouri constitution is entirely different than the federal constitution’s famous “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”  And therefore federal practice is of little or no real importance.  Still, Governor Greitens defenders will surely try to use precedent from any source if they think it helps their man.  The impeachment of Judge Porteous takes one possible argument off the table.

The Porteous case is of greater potential importance should Mr. Trump ever face a formal impeachment inquiry.  Inasmuch as the Mueller investigation focuses largely on contacts between Mr. Trump and his associates and agents of Russia prior to Trump’s inauguration, the Porteous precedent places any misbehavior in that period squarely within the purview of the congressional impeachment power.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 8 (More on impeachment for pre-office conduct)

24 Tuesday Apr 2018

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By Frank Bowman

I’ve written before on this site expressing the view that a Missouri state official may constitutionally be impeached for conduct prior to taking office. Last week, former Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court Michael Wolff expressed the contrary opinion in an op-ed in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.  As much as I respect Judge Wolff for his legal acumen and his many contributions to this state, on this point at least, I have to respectfully disagree.

Consequently, I wrote a rebuttal explaining why impeachment for pre-office conduct is surely permissible which was published in the Post-Dispatch yesterday.  Here’s the link to the article.  And it is reproduced in full below.

Yes, the Governor Can Be Impeached Right Now

Michael Wolff, former Chief Judge of the Missouri Supreme Court, recently wrote that, Governor Eric Greitens cannot constitutionally be impeached for misconduct committed before he assumed office.   

 I admire Judge Wolff immensely. But I respectfully disagree.

First, the Missouri constitution places no time limit on impeachable conduct.  It defines impeachable behavior as “crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.” 

Some items on this list — “willful neglect of duty, corruption in office … or oppression in office” — unmistakably refer to official misbehavior.  Several others are probably meant to have an official connection. “Incompetency” probably refers either to a debilitating mental breakdown or an evident inability to perform official functions.  Similarly, “habitual drunkenness” before, but not during, an officeholder’s term can’t possibly be a sound reason to impeach.

Likewise, the phrase “any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office” could be interpreted to require that the words “in office” modify both “moral turpitude” and “oppression.” Then the phrase could be read like this: “any offense involving moral turpitude [in office} and oppression in office.” That’s at least plausible.

But Jim Layton, former Solicitor General of Missouri, points out that, at the time this constitutional impeachment language was written in 1945, “oppression in office” was, and long had been, a specific statutory crime. Therefore, the phrase “oppression in office” was just the name of one offense for which an officeholder could be impeached. Thus, it is very unlikely that the words “in office” were intended to reach back up the sentence and limit the impeachability of an “offense of moral turpitude” to crimes committed during an officeholder’s term.

But even if we didn’t know this clarifying fact about old Missouri law, the real textual problem for Judge Wolff’s argument is that the constitutional list of impeachable conduct starts with the words “crimes [and] misconduct,” and those terms aren’t modified in any way that limits them to the period following assumption of official duties.

Most importantly, as a matter of good governance and common sense, the notion that a governor can’t be impeached for conduct that predates his inauguration can’t be right.  If it were to be discovered that a governor had bribed election officials to help secure election, no one would suppose that the governor couldn’t be impeached on that basis, even though the conduct occurred before he took office.

Governor Greitens’ defenders might concede that pre-inaugural misconduct can sometimes count, but insist that impeachment is limited to conduct directly related to the electoral or appointive process by which the person impeached gained office. 

But that’s not what the Missouri constitution says.  And such a rule would be irrational.  Suppose a sitting governor accepted bribes while he occupied a previous state position, or committed murder six months before his election.  Would anyone seriously suggest that such a governor could not be impeached and removed?  The necessity of impeachment is made clear by the multiple Missouri cases flatly holding that the only means of removing a constitutional officer (such as the governor) is impeachment, even if the officer has also been convicted of a crime. In short, if we can’t impeach a criminal governor, we’re stuck with him until his term expires, even if he’s sitting in jail as a convicted felon.  That can’t be right.  And the Missouri constitution does not require that result.

Finally, Judge Wolff notes that there have been no federal impeachments for pre-office conduct.  That’s true, but irrelevant. [NOTE: As I observe in a later blog post, this is not actually the case – the most recent impeachment of a federal judge included an article charging misconduct while the judge was on the state bench.] Missouri chose not to adopt the “high crimes and misdemeanors” formula of the U.S. constitution. In Missouri, the words of the Missouri constitution govern. Moreover, almost all federal impeachments have been of judges, and grounds for their removal are arguably limited to misconduct in office by the constitutional guarantee that they will remain in office “during good behavior.” Finally, no serious student of federal impeachment law doubts that federal officials could be removed for pre-office behavior if sufficiently serious.

The question for the Missouri House is not when the governor may have committed offenses, but whether such offenses fit within the words of the Missouri constitution and are serious enough to merit impeachment.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 7 (The “eminent jurists”)

18 Wednesday Apr 2018

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By Frank Bowman

An inquisitive reader, and former excellent student of mine, wrote in with a question about precisely who would try any impeachment charges against Governor Greitens approved by the Missouri House of Representatives.  He correctly noted that Article VII, Section 2 of the Missouri constitution provides that, if the governor or a member of the state supreme court is impeached, the trial of the articles of impeachment is to held before a “special commission of seven eminent jurists to be elected by the senate.”  But he wanted to know who counts as an “eminent jurist.”

Before I could respond, my industrious correspondent found and sent me the answer in a statute, RSMo 106.080, which states:

If the governor or a judge of the supreme court shall be impeached, the house of representatives shall immediately transmit such articles of impeachment to the senate who shall, without delay, proceed to the election of a special commission to try the cause, which commission shall be composed of seven eminent jurists, who at the time of their election are judges of the circuit or appellate courts of this state; provided, however, that judges of the supreme court shall not be eligible to serve on such special commission. The commission shall meet in the City of Jefferson within thirty days after their election on a day designated by the senate.

In short, by statute, only sitting circuit and appeals judges can be on the special commission.

ADDENDUM: After I first posted this analysis, my eminent friend Jim Layton, former Solicitor General of Missouri, pointed out that “eminent jurists” is a vague term that could be read to include retired judges, federal or state, and that it’s doubtful the legislature can, by statute, modify the meaning of a constitutional term.  I take his point, but since the constitution requires that the “eminent jurists” be “elected by the Senate,” my bet is that they follow the rule they plainly thought they had the power to enact.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition (Part 6 – Pre-inaugural crime)

12 Thursday Apr 2018

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by Frank Bowman

Missouri has been agog for the past 36 hours over the publication of a report by a special committee of the Missouri House of Representatives detailing allegations of sexual infidelity and, perhaps, sexual crime by Governor Eric Greitens.  Yesterday, I discussed the particulars of the report and and concluded that the story of the woman at the center of the affair, if believed, arguably describes both criminal violations and impeachable offenses.

I return today to amplify on the question of impeachability.  Were I one of Mr. Greitens’ lawyers, I might argue that, even if everything his former stylist said is true and thus that he technically committed criminal sexual offenses, the conduct occurred long before he was elected and thus cannot be the subject of impeachment.

To this there are at least two possible responses:

First, the Missouri constitution places no temporal limit on impeachable conduct.  Article I, Section 7, lists as impeachable conduct “crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.”  Of course, about half of the items on this list unmistakably refer to official misbehavior — “willful neglect of duty, corruption in office … or oppression in office.”

And the phrasing of the passage strongly implies that several of the other listed items are meant to have an official nexus, as well. For example, were I the governor’s lawyer, I’d argue that impeaching a state official for “incompetency” only makes sense if he or she is “incompetent” at performing the functions of state office.  One wouldn’t impeach a judge or a governor for inability to play the saxaphone or grill a steak.  Similarly, I’d suggest that “habitual drunkenness” before, but not during, an officeholder’s term can’t possibly be a sound reason to impeach.

Likewise, the governor’s lawyer’s might contend that the most plausible reading of “any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office” is that offenses involving moral turpitude also have to occur at least while the official is “in office,” and better still, in connection with official duties.  Personally, I don’t find the last part of that construction very compelling; it seems more likely to me that the drafters meant that any offense involving “moral turpitude,” regardless of its direct connection to official duties, could trigger impeachment.  The question of whether the morally turpitudinous behavior has to happen during the officeholder’s term seems to me more uncertain.

But the textual problem for Mr. Greitens’ defenders is that the constitutional list of impeachable conduct contains several items that are neither logically or gramatically restricted to the officeholder’s term.  The list starts with the words “crimes [and] misconduct,” and those terms aren’t obviously modified in any way that limits them to the period following assumption of official duties.

My second objection to an argument that a governor can’t be impeached for conduct that predates his inauguration is that, as a matter of sound policy, that can’t be right.  If it were to be discovered that a governor had bribed election officials to help secure election, or that a judge had bribed the governor to secure appointment to the bench, no one would suppose that the governor or the judge couldn’t be impeached on that basis, even though the conduct occurred before he or she took office.

The governor’s defenders might respond by conceding that pre-inaugural misconduct can count, but only if it was directly related to the electoral or appointive process by which office was attained.  But that, too, is plainly an unduly restrictive rule.

Suppose a sitting governor were found to have accepted bribes while he occupied a previous state position, or that he had committed murder six months before his election.  Would anyone seriously suggest that such a governor could not be impeached and removed?  The necessity of impeachment in such a case is made manifest by the multiple Missouri cases that have held that the only means of removing a constitutional officer is impeachment, regardless of whether such officer has also been convicted of a crime. In short, if we can’t impeach a criminal governor, we’re stuck with him until his term expires.  And that can’t be right.

My bottom line on all this is that the language of the Missouri constitution does not prohibit impeachment for pre-inaugural conduct.  Rather, the issue remains whether the House of Representatives considers the officeholder’s conduct violative of law and sufficiently egregious to merit removal.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 4 (Erratum)

13 Tuesday Mar 2018

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By Frank Bowman

If one is going to offer oneself as an “expert” on stuff to the press, one has to be ready for the inevitable humbling moments when one’s off-the-cuff opinions prove wrong.  The other day, the Columbia Missourian interviewed me about impeachment procedure in Missouri, and I suggested that, if Governor Greitens were convicted of a felony in St. Louis,  then RSMo 561.021, which disqualifies any elected official from office if convicted of a felony, would require Gov. Greitens’ immediate removal from office without the necessity of an impeachment proceeding.

A better-informed reader of the Missourian wrote in to say, politely, that I was talking through my hat.  Rather, the reader pointed out, several Missouri cases have held that, in  the case of statewide offices which are created by the constitution and for which the constitutionally prescribed means of removal is impeachment, the legislature may not prescribe some other removal procedure.  For those interested, the main cases are State Ex Inf. Attorney-General v. Brunk, 34 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1930) and State ex Inf. Nixon v. Moriarty, 893 S.W.2d 806 (1995).

Had I been thinking more clearly before succumbing to the pleasures of bloviation, I would have realized that the federal constitutional principle that permits removal of “the President, Vice President and all civil officers” only upon impeachment should apply equally in the states.  Missouri differs from the federal situation in that Missouri has a statute that purports to disqualify all elected officials who suffer a felony conviction.  But the principle that has forestalled Congress from attempting to pass felony disqualification laws or other removal shortcuts for federal officeholders is the same in both the federal and state situation. The basic idea is that, if the fundamental law of a nation or state provides an exclusive means of removing the holders of major offices, then the legislature cannot create a shortcut to that end through enactment of a mere statute.

So, with thanks to the Missourian‘s astute reader, I stand corrected.  If Governor Greitens is to be removed, it will be through impeachment, even if he is first convicted of a felony in St. Louis.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition – Part 3 (The Picture)

10 Saturday Feb 2018

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This site has previously discussed the Missouri law applicable to impeachment of governors and its application to the sex scandal swirling around Gov. Eric Greitens. We have previously noted that state officials are impeachable for virtually any misconduct violative of state law, including criminal misdemeanors.  We have observed that the offense Mr. Greitens seems most likely to have committed (if the publicly reported information proves accurate) is invasion of privacy, RSMo 565.252.

Mr. Greitens would be guilty of this crime if he took a picture, without the consent of the woman with whom he was having a sexual interlude, while she was fully or partially unclothed.  Mr. Greitens would be guilty of the more serious felony offense of tampering with physical evidence, RSMo 575.100, if he took such a picture and later, “Alter[ed], destroy[ed], suppresse[d] or conceal[ed the photo] with purpose to impair its verity, legibility or availability in any official proceeding or investigation.”

The question of whether such a picture was ever taken, and if so what happened to it, has become a running theme in Mr. Greitens’ interactions with his critics and with members of the press. Several days ago, for example, a reporter for the St. Louis Post Dispatch asked Mr. Greitens directly whether he had taken a photo of his former mistress.  Mr. Greitens declined to answer, claiming that he had answered questions about the matter before. However, Mr. Greitens has never denied taking such a picture, despite having had multiple opportunities to do so.  In his most extensive previous statement, Mr. Greitens said:

“This was a consensual relationship. There was no blackmail, there was no violence, there was no threat of violence, there was no threat of blackmail, there was no threat of using a photograph for blackmail. All of those things are false.”

Note that he denies “using a photograph for blackmail,” not taking a photograph in the first place.  It’s a curious circumlocution.  If no photograph was taken, why not say so plainly, and as Ephesians 6:14 puts it: “Stand firm then, with the belt of truth buckled around your waist, with the breastplate of righteousness in place”?

Indeed, even if one’s belt of truth had of late come unbuckled, it would make sense to deny that a photograph was ever taken … unless, of course, there really was a photograph and one feared that evidence of its existence might surface.

It may prove that Mr. Greitens was simply inartful in his original statements about this matter, and is now simply being unwisely stubborn in his refusal to amplify on an undoubtedly painful subject.  Still, if Mr. Greitens neither took nor destroyed an incriminating photograph, he ought to say so in plain terms and put the matter to rest.  So long as he evades these questions, a cloud of suspicion rather larger than a man’s hand will hang over his office and unnecessarily complicate the state’s affairs.

Frank Bowman

Impeachment in the states: Missouri governor edition, Part I

19 Friday Jan 2018

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By Frank Bowman

Here in the Show-Me State, we have been granted a temporary reprieve from the feverish national focus on all things Trump by news of the sexual peccadillos of our recently-elected governor, Eric Greitens. As has now been reported across the nation, on Wednesday, January 10, shortly after his State of the State address, Governor Greitens released a statement admitting to a extramarital sexual affair with his former hairdresser back in 2015.

The admission came in anticipation of impending media reports alleging not only that there were one or more sexual encounters between the hairdresser and Mr. Greitens, but that on one occasion Mr. Greitens took a picture of the woman while she was bound and in a state of full or partial undress and then threatened to release the picture publicly if she were ever to speak about the affair. The reports were made all the juicier by the fact that the woman’s former husband secretly recorded her tearful confession to the affair and released the recording to the media.

In his statement, Mr. Greitens admitted the sex, but denied that he had either taken a picture of the woman en déshabillé or threatened to release such a picture to maintain her silence.

Political reaction to these revelations has been swift and somewhat surprisingly severe given that Mr. Greitens is a first-term Republican governor often touted as a rising political star in a state where Republicans hold all but one state-wide office and supermajorities in both houses of the legislature. Democrats immediately called for Mr. Greitens’ resignation, as have multiple Republican legislators. Even Republicans who haven’t gone that far seem, at best, to be withholding judgment pending the outcome of a criminal investigation by the St. Louis Circuit Attorney (and possibly one by the FBI).  One Republican state senator, Gary Romine, said that if investigations into Mr. Greitens’ behavior do not exonerate him, he should “resign or face impeachment.”

Naturally, as soon as I read the word “impeachment,” I perked up like a foxhound when the Master of the Hunt yells “Talley Ho!”  What follows is a two-part look at the law governing impeachment of Missouri state officials, a comparison of Missouri law to federal practice, and a preview of the particular issues an effort to impeach Mr. Greitens would present given the current state of the evidence.

Impeachment in Missouri

Article VII, Sections 1 and 2 of the Missouri constitution state:

Section 1. All elective executive officials of the state, and judges of the supreme court, courts of appeals and circuit courts shall be liable to impeachment for crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.

Section 2. The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. All impeachments shall be tried before the supreme court, except that the governor or a member of the supreme court shall be tried by a special commission of seven eminent jurists to be elected by the senate. The supreme court or special commission shall take an oath to try impartially the person impeached, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of five-sevenths of the court or special commission.

The most obvious difference between federal and state impeachment procedure is that, while in both systems the house of representatives impeaches the officer, i.e., specifies the charges against the accused, in Missouri the state supreme court, rather than the senate, tries the case. That is, the Missouri Supreme Court, not the Missouri senate, decides whether the allegations in the bill of impeachment are proven and thus whether the officer ought to be removed.  The way the Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted its function materially alters the Missouri impeachment process.

In the federal system, the president may be impeached for serious crimes (although there is disagreement about which ones) and for very serious non-criminal misconduct either in relation to the office or of a personal sort that undermines the president’s legitimacy. Most scholars would agree that, under the federal constitution, the president ought not be impeached for minor crimes (and perhaps not even for serious crimes like perjury if unrelated to his official duties) or for laziness, ineptitude, or pursuing political objectives contrary to those of the legislative majority.

Critically, all informed observers of the federal impeachment process agree that both the decision by the House about which behavior is impeachable and the subsequent decision by Senate about whether to convict and remove the accused are to a significant degree “political.”  As Alexander Hamilton famously said in Federalist #65, impeachable offenses “are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”

The concededly political character of the federal impeachment process shapes the essential nature of the decision-making process.  Both the House and Senate are called upon not merely to decide the truth of factual allegations against the president, but to judge whether the conduct is of a nature that merits removal of the nation’s chief executive officer.  The second choice is a political judgment which the Framers consciously placed in the hands of two political bodies.

The Missouri constitution originally consigned the trial of impeachments to the state senate.  But in the 1940’s (perhaps in response to a case where the senate refused to convict a former senator whose factual guilt was patent), the constitution was amended to institute the present arrangement assigning impeachment trials to the state supreme court. The apparent purpose of the change was to eliminate politics from the last stage of the impeachment process, but as is so often true, this benevolent-sounding objective created a new complication.

In theory, courts are not supposed to be political bodies.  In theory, they are limited to deciding what the law is, whether facts are proven, and whether proven facts fall within the ambit of the law. Of course, any serious student of courts realizes that politics in the broad sense affects judicial decisions at every level. Judges unavoidably bring their own philosophical predilections to deciding both law and facts, and perhaps more importantly, common law judging has always had a public policy component.  Nonetheless, judges traditionally shun explicitly political judgments – such as whether removal of a particular executive branch official would or would not be beneficial to the commonweal.

This judicial discomfort manifested itself in the only Missouri impeachment case to arise after the constitution was amended to give the responsibility of trying impeachments to the supreme court. The case, Matter of Impeachment of Judith K. Moriarty, 902 S.W.2d 273 (1994), arose from the impeachment of the Missouri Secretary of State for “knowingly allow[ing] the signature of her son as candidate or of her administrative aide or both to be placed on an unsigned declaration of candidacy [for public office] so that declaration falsely declared that the son had appeared in presence of aide to declare for office within the time provided for by statute.”

The Missouri Supreme Court found that Ms. Moriarty did what the articles of impeachment charged, thus removing her from office. The interesting part is the court’s explanation of its role in the impeachment process. The court began by contrasting the traditional impeachment system in which the house impeaches and the senate tries the accused with the Missouri system of trial by supreme court:

An impeachment is thus a judgment by the House of Representatives—one of the popularly-elected, representative bodies of the people’s General Assembly—that an officer of the state has committed acts such that, were an election held, the people would not permit the impeached officeholder to remain in office. When a Senate determines whether to convict under articles of impeachment, the vote affirms or rejects the judgment of the House. Under this system, the possibility exists that the House may impeach and the Senate may convict an official for purely political reasons, though they clothe their charges with constitutional language like “misconduct.”

Missouri’s constitutional provision is a clear acknowledgment that the trial of impeachment charges is essentially judicial in character and is not a political function. This Court can convict only where there is actual misconduct as the law defines it. “Misconduct” means doing an unlawful act, doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner, or failing to perform an act required by law. It does not include errors in judgment, acts done in good faith, or good faith exercise of discretion.

This passage is remarkable in several respects.

First, it offers a distorted interpretation of the standard for defining an impeachable offense in federal and state systems in which legislators both formulate and try the articles of impeachment. The court opines that in such systems legislators are supposed to engage in a sort of mass mind-reading exercise assessing the probable electoral reaction of the public to the charged conduct. I confess to thinking this assessment misguided. In the federal system, at least, it is quite clear that senators are intended to exercise independent judgment, and that they should not decline to convict an office holder merely because they think the public might re-elect him despite constitutionally obnoxious conduct.  Were that the case, no demagogue could ever be impeached so long as he retained the probable support of the mob.

Moreover, when the Missouri court disparages senate impeachment trials on the ground that an officeholder may be convicted “for purely political reasons,” it betrays a crabbed and historically inaccurate view of what Founders like Hamilton meant by “political.”  For Hamilton and others of his generation, the term “political” ran far beyond narrowly partisan considerations to broad considerations of constitutional balance and societal good.  For them, impeachment was “political” because it demanded the exercise of sound judgment about whether removing a particular officer for particular conduct protected or disserved republican government.

More important from Governor Greitens’ standpoint is the court’s holding that, because judges and not legislators try Missouri impeachments, there can be a conviction only:

… where there is actual misconduct as the law defines it. ‘Misconduct’ means doing an unlawful act, doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner, or failing to perform an act required by law. It does not include errors in judgment, acts done in good faith, or good faith exercise of discretion.

This is huge because it markedly narrows the definition of impeachable conduct.  Indeed, the result is to judicially amend the Missouri constitution.  Recall that Article VII, Section 1 of the Missouri constitution says that officials may be impeached for “crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.”

Some of the items on this list obviously do refer to illegal conduct, notably “crimes … corruption in office, [and] any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.” On the other hand, the constitutional text pretty plainly contemplates impeachment for lots of behavior that violates no other law. For example, neither “habitual drunkenness” nor “incompetency” is illegal.  Nor is either “willful neglect of duty” or “misconduct” necessarily a legal infraction.

To maintain its preferred self-conception of non-political arbiter of facts, the Missouri Supreme Court imposed a limiting construction on the constitutional term “misconduct” that requires the impeached official to have violated some other law.  (For you law geeks in the audience, it does so by the extremely dubious expedient of adopting its definition of “misconduct” from a Tennessee case construing the common law crime of “official misconduct,” an offense which exists nowhere in Missouri law.” Mid–South Indoor Horse Racing, Inc. v. Tennessee State Racing Commission,798 S.W.2d 531, 538 (Tenn.App.1990).)

Notably, the laws the Court found Ms. Moriarty to have violated were simply statutory rules for proper filing of candidacy for office.  Failing to perform the duties prescribed in these sections was apparently chargeable as a misdemeanor (perhaps under RSMo 115.641).  Moreover, it appears that, prior to the impeachment proceeding, Ms. Moriarty was charged in Cole County and convicted of such a misdemeanor for her conduct.  But curiously, the Missouri Supreme Court made no reference in its opinion either to the Cole County proceeding or to any violation of criminal law.  The bottom line of Moriarty seems to be that, on the one hand, the Supreme Court will not convict in an impeachment case unless the charged conduct violates state law, but on the other hand, violation of any state law, however minor, will result in conviction and removal so long as the Missouri House of Representatives deems it impeachable.

One sympathizes with Court’s reluctance to stray from its traditional judicial role, but the result is a markedly strained reading of the Missouri constitution — and one that could have considerable impact on any effort to impeach Governor Greitens.

I will address the specifics of the Greitens case in my next post.

Frank Bowman