Tag Archives: Missouri constitution

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 11 (More on suspension after impeachment)

09 Wednesday May 2018

Posted by in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , ,

By Frank Bowman

Jason Hancock, a diligent reporter from the Kansas City Star, alerted me to a Missouri constitutional provision that kicks up even more dust on the question of whether Governor Greitens could be suspended from office following impeachment by the House, but before conviction by the panel of seven “eminent jurists” appointed by the Senate.

Article IV, Section 11(a) of the Missouri constitution states:

On the death, conviction or impeachment, or resignation of the governor, the lieutenant governor shall become governor for the remainder of the term.

Candidly, this language is almost impenetrable.

It says that the Lt. Gov takes over for “the remainder of the term” upon “the death, conviction or impeachment, or resignation of the governor.”  But it is entirely unclear about what “conviction or impeachment” means.  “Impeachment” could mean just a vote by the House on articles of impeachment, which is usually the technical meaning of that term.  But that can’t be right in this context because that would mean that the Lt. Gov. becomes the governor, and stays governor until the end of the term, as soon as the House votes and regardless of what the judges do.

Which leads one to think that the drafters intended “impeachment” in this context to mean completion of the whole process – the House vote and then the “eminent jurist” vote.

But if so, that leaves unexplained the word “conviction” in the odd phrase “conviction or impeachment.”  Does conviction here refer solely to the impeachment setting and thus to the verdict of the eminent jurists?  That would make logical sense, but it makes no grammatical sense because of the word “or” connecting conviction with impeachment.  In other words, one cannot have an impeachment conviction without first having a House impeachment vote, but one can have a separate criminal conviction regardless of whether there is an impeachment proceeding.

In which case, does conviction refer to some kind of conviction independent of an impeachment proceeding?  But that makes no sense because the term “conviction” doesn’t seem to have a definition.  Presumably, outside of the impeachment context it would have to refer to a criminal conviction.  But absent any other qualifier, it would include every kind and degree of criminal conviction from murder to jaywalking.  And that can’t be right.

Here’s my best guess:  The sensible way to read this is that the governor stays governor until the impeachment process – House vote and judge vote – produces a final result.  At which point, if the governor is impeached and convicted, the Lt. Governor takes over as governor for the remainder of the governor’s term.  But this sensible reading is not necessarily required by the text.

In addition, as explained in my last post, the governor could be suspended from exercising his official powers in the interval between the House impeachment vote and judicial vote on the articles of impeachment if the “eminent jurists” vote to suspend him.  Presumably, the Lt. Governor would take over the powers of governor during the suspension, to return them if the governor were acquitted, but keep them until the end of the governor’s term if the governor were convicted.

 

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 8 (More on impeachment for pre-office conduct)

24 Tuesday Apr 2018

Posted by in Uncategorized

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , ,

By Frank Bowman

I’ve written before on this site expressing the view that a Missouri state official may constitutionally be impeached for conduct prior to taking office. Last week, former Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court Michael Wolff expressed the contrary opinion in an op-ed in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.  As much as I respect Judge Wolff for his legal acumen and his many contributions to this state, on this point at least, I have to respectfully disagree.

Consequently, I wrote a rebuttal explaining why impeachment for pre-office conduct is surely permissible which was published in the Post-Dispatch yesterday.  Here’s the link to the article.  And it is reproduced in full below.

Yes, the Governor Can Be Impeached Right Now

Michael Wolff, former Chief Judge of the Missouri Supreme Court, recently wrote that, Governor Eric Greitens cannot constitutionally be impeached for misconduct committed before he assumed office.   

 I admire Judge Wolff immensely. But I respectfully disagree.

First, the Missouri constitution places no time limit on impeachable conduct.  It defines impeachable behavior as “crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.” 

Some items on this list — “willful neglect of duty, corruption in office … or oppression in office” — unmistakably refer to official misbehavior.  Several others are probably meant to have an official connection. “Incompetency” probably refers either to a debilitating mental breakdown or an evident inability to perform official functions.  Similarly, “habitual drunkenness” before, but not during, an officeholder’s term can’t possibly be a sound reason to impeach.

Likewise, the phrase “any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office” could be interpreted to require that the words “in office” modify both “moral turpitude” and “oppression.” Then the phrase could be read like this: “any offense involving moral turpitude [in office} and oppression in office.” That’s at least plausible.

But Jim Layton, former Solicitor General of Missouri, points out that, at the time this constitutional impeachment language was written in 1945, “oppression in office” was, and long had been, a specific statutory crime. Therefore, the phrase “oppression in office” was just the name of one offense for which an officeholder could be impeached. Thus, it is very unlikely that the words “in office” were intended to reach back up the sentence and limit the impeachability of an “offense of moral turpitude” to crimes committed during an officeholder’s term.

But even if we didn’t know this clarifying fact about old Missouri law, the real textual problem for Judge Wolff’s argument is that the constitutional list of impeachable conduct starts with the words “crimes [and] misconduct,” and those terms aren’t modified in any way that limits them to the period following assumption of official duties.

Most importantly, as a matter of good governance and common sense, the notion that a governor can’t be impeached for conduct that predates his inauguration can’t be right.  If it were to be discovered that a governor had bribed election officials to help secure election, no one would suppose that the governor couldn’t be impeached on that basis, even though the conduct occurred before he took office.

Governor Greitens’ defenders might concede that pre-inaugural misconduct can sometimes count, but insist that impeachment is limited to conduct directly related to the electoral or appointive process by which the person impeached gained office. 

But that’s not what the Missouri constitution says.  And such a rule would be irrational.  Suppose a sitting governor accepted bribes while he occupied a previous state position, or committed murder six months before his election.  Would anyone seriously suggest that such a governor could not be impeached and removed?  The necessity of impeachment is made clear by the multiple Missouri cases flatly holding that the only means of removing a constitutional officer (such as the governor) is impeachment, even if the officer has also been convicted of a crime. In short, if we can’t impeach a criminal governor, we’re stuck with him until his term expires, even if he’s sitting in jail as a convicted felon.  That can’t be right.  And the Missouri constitution does not require that result.

Finally, Judge Wolff notes that there have been no federal impeachments for pre-office conduct.  That’s true, but irrelevant. [NOTE: As I observe in a later blog post, this is not actually the case – the most recent impeachment of a federal judge included an article charging misconduct while the judge was on the state bench.] Missouri chose not to adopt the “high crimes and misdemeanors” formula of the U.S. constitution. In Missouri, the words of the Missouri constitution govern. Moreover, almost all federal impeachments have been of judges, and grounds for their removal are arguably limited to misconduct in office by the constitutional guarantee that they will remain in office “during good behavior.” Finally, no serious student of federal impeachment law doubts that federal officials could be removed for pre-office behavior if sufficiently serious.

The question for the Missouri House is not when the governor may have committed offenses, but whether such offenses fit within the words of the Missouri constitution and are serious enough to merit impeachment.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition (Part 6 – Pre-inaugural crime)

12 Thursday Apr 2018

Posted by in Uncategorized

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , ,

by Frank Bowman

Missouri has been agog for the past 36 hours over the publication of a report by a special committee of the Missouri House of Representatives detailing allegations of sexual infidelity and, perhaps, sexual crime by Governor Eric Greitens.  Yesterday, I discussed the particulars of the report and and concluded that the story of the woman at the center of the affair, if believed, arguably describes both criminal violations and impeachable offenses.

I return today to amplify on the question of impeachability.  Were I one of Mr. Greitens’ lawyers, I might argue that, even if everything his former stylist said is true and thus that he technically committed criminal sexual offenses, the conduct occurred long before he was elected and thus cannot be the subject of impeachment.

To this there are at least two possible responses:

First, the Missouri constitution places no temporal limit on impeachable conduct.  Article I, Section 7, lists as impeachable conduct “crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.”  Of course, about half of the items on this list unmistakably refer to official misbehavior — “willful neglect of duty, corruption in office … or oppression in office.”

And the phrasing of the passage strongly implies that several of the other listed items are meant to have an official nexus, as well. For example, were I the governor’s lawyer, I’d argue that impeaching a state official for “incompetency” only makes sense if he or she is “incompetent” at performing the functions of state office.  One wouldn’t impeach a judge or a governor for inability to play the saxaphone or grill a steak.  Similarly, I’d suggest that “habitual drunkenness” before, but not during, an officeholder’s term can’t possibly be a sound reason to impeach.

Likewise, the governor’s lawyer’s might contend that the most plausible reading of “any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office” is that offenses involving moral turpitude also have to occur at least while the official is “in office,” and better still, in connection with official duties.  Personally, I don’t find the last part of that construction very compelling; it seems more likely to me that the drafters meant that any offense involving “moral turpitude,” regardless of its direct connection to official duties, could trigger impeachment.  The question of whether the morally turpitudinous behavior has to happen during the officeholder’s term seems to me more uncertain.

But the textual problem for Mr. Greitens’ defenders is that the constitutional list of impeachable conduct contains several items that are neither logically or gramatically restricted to the officeholder’s term.  The list starts with the words “crimes [and] misconduct,” and those terms aren’t obviously modified in any way that limits them to the period following assumption of official duties.

My second objection to an argument that a governor can’t be impeached for conduct that predates his inauguration is that, as a matter of sound policy, that can’t be right.  If it were to be discovered that a governor had bribed election officials to help secure election, or that a judge had bribed the governor to secure appointment to the bench, no one would suppose that the governor or the judge couldn’t be impeached on that basis, even though the conduct occurred before he or she took office.

The governor’s defenders might respond by conceding that pre-inaugural misconduct can count, but only if it was directly related to the electoral or appointive process by which office was attained.  But that, too, is plainly an unduly restrictive rule.

Suppose a sitting governor were found to have accepted bribes while he occupied a previous state position, or that he had committed murder six months before his election.  Would anyone seriously suggest that such a governor could not be impeached and removed?  The necessity of impeachment in such a case is made manifest by the multiple Missouri cases that have held that the only means of removing a constitutional officer is impeachment, regardless of whether such officer has also been convicted of a crime. In short, if we can’t impeach a criminal governor, we’re stuck with him until his term expires.  And that can’t be right.

My bottom line on all this is that the language of the Missouri constitution does not prohibit impeachment for pre-inaugural conduct.  Rather, the issue remains whether the House of Representatives considers the officeholder’s conduct violative of law and sufficiently egregious to merit removal.

Impeachment in the States: Missouri Governor Edition, Part 4 (Erratum)

13 Tuesday Mar 2018

Posted by in Uncategorized

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , ,

By Frank Bowman

If one is going to offer oneself as an “expert” on stuff to the press, one has to be ready for the inevitable humbling moments when one’s off-the-cuff opinions prove wrong.  The other day, the Columbia Missourian interviewed me about impeachment procedure in Missouri, and I suggested that, if Governor Greitens were convicted of a felony in St. Louis,  then RSMo 561.021, which disqualifies any elected official from office if convicted of a felony, would require Gov. Greitens’ immediate removal from office without the necessity of an impeachment proceeding.

A better-informed reader of the Missourian wrote in to say, politely, that I was talking through my hat.  Rather, the reader pointed out, several Missouri cases have held that, in  the case of statewide offices which are created by the constitution and for which the constitutionally prescribed means of removal is impeachment, the legislature may not prescribe some other removal procedure.  For those interested, the main cases are State Ex Inf. Attorney-General v. Brunk, 34 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1930) and State ex Inf. Nixon v. Moriarty, 893 S.W.2d 806 (1995).

Had I been thinking more clearly before succumbing to the pleasures of bloviation, I would have realized that the federal constitutional principle that permits removal of “the President, Vice President and all civil officers” only upon impeachment should apply equally in the states.  Missouri differs from the federal situation in that Missouri has a statute that purports to disqualify all elected officials who suffer a felony conviction.  But the principle that has forestalled Congress from attempting to pass felony disqualification laws or other removal shortcuts for federal officeholders is the same in both the federal and state situation. The basic idea is that, if the fundamental law of a nation or state provides an exclusive means of removing the holders of major offices, then the legislature cannot create a shortcut to that end through enactment of a mere statute.

So, with thanks to the Missourian‘s astute reader, I stand corrected.  If Governor Greitens is to be removed, it will be through impeachment, even if he is first convicted of a felony in St. Louis.