A different, more protective, view of Robert Mueller from the Senate

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Several days ago, I noted with dismay that a large majority of the Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee sent a letter to Attorney General Sessions calling for a second special counsel, in addition to Robert Mueller, to investigate alleged malfeasance by Hillary Clinton, Loretta Lynch, James Comey, and a grab-bag of other people and events associated in one way or another with the Democratic side of the recent presidential campaign.  I lamented this letter as both a transparent attempt to deflect attention from Mr. Mueller’s Russia investigation and a distressing instance of Republican participation in Mr. Trump’s assault on democratic norms.

A number of Republican senators have taken a quite different approach – proposing legislation that would make it difficult for Mr. Trump to remove Mr. Mueller.  Republican Senator Lindsey Graham and Democratic Senator Corey Booker are co-sponsoring a bill that would both prevent dismissal of a special counsel absent good cause and make such a dismissal reviewable by a panel of judges.  A similar bill co-sponsored by Senators Thom Tillis, R-N.C., and Chris Coons, D-Del., would allow a special counsel to challenge his removal in court.

I have two reactions to these efforts:

First, I am heartened that Republicans in the Senate are taking a far more responsible position than their House colleagues toward Congress’s constitutional obligation to monitor and check executive wrongdoing.    Whether Mr. Mueller ever finds evidence of serious malfeasance or not, these Republican Senators give one hope that bare partisanship has not utterly neutered at least one half of the national legislature.

Second, having said this, there are real doubts about the approach adopted in these bills. In important respects, both bills would be a reversion to the now-defunct post-Watergate independent counsel law.  It is widely agreed that the degree of autonomy conferred on “independent counsel,” the monocular focus of such investigations on a single target, the immense resources made available to ICs, and the breadth of the federal criminal law too often meant that ICs ventured far afield from their original mandate, digging and digging until they found some crime, however inconsequential.  That law was allowed to lapse after the Clinton fiasco for a reason.

I wholeheartedly support the notion that Congress should signal to Mr. Trump – and strongly – that it will not tolerate either a premature dismissal of Mr. Mueller or efforts to obstruct his investigation.  But it is not at all clear that the signal should be sent in the form of a statute – a law – that will persist beyond the current crisis and is quite likely to come back to bite us later.

I am therefore in some sympathy with former White House Bob Bauer, who argues that the appropriate congressional response to a firing of Mueller should be the initiation of impeachment inquiries employing its own undoubted investigative authority.  That said, while Mr. Bauer’s criticism of both the old Independent Counsel law and the proposed legislation seems spot on, one cannot but wonder how likely formal impeachment proceedings or even serious preliminaries to a congressional impeachment investigation are given the current composition of Congress.  Here, it is particularly important to note that any impeachment inquiry must begin in the House, and customarily in the very Judiciary Committee whose hyperpartisan disposition has been on recent display.  Mr. Bauer, to his credit, tacitly concedes the improbability of a prompt move to impeachment, but notes that the Senate at least has sent other kinds of disapproving signals to the White House, included pointed indications that it might not consider a replacement to Jeff Sessions if he were fired as a means of getting to Mueller.

I am less impressed with Professor Rick Pildes’s suggestion that Congress could attempt to forestall Mueller’s firing by codifying existing DOJ regulations regarding special counsel.  As I pointed out in Slate some weeks ago, those regulations would not prevent Mr. Trump from firing Mr. Mueller if he is determined to do it.  They create some procedural hurdles, but a president already determined to endure the political damage such a firing would entail could surmount those with ease.  If he is determined to fire Mueller, he’ll just dismiss Attorney General Sessions and then work his way through the DOJ hierarchy until he finds someone willing to issue the order.  The regulations will have been satisfied and Mueller will be gone. Turning the current regulations into statutes would do nothing to change that calculus.

Professor Pildes’ proposal might serve one salutary function.  Perhaps bicameral endorsement of DOJ standards making firing a special counsel difficult would signal to Mr. Trump that Congress as a whole would seriously contemplate impeachment if he fired Mueller.  But, again, the House of Representatives would have to vote in favor of this legislation.  And at present, that is hard to envision.

Still, one should take some solace in signs of the Senate’s slow awakening to its constitutional responsibilities.

A reality check for impeachment enthusiasts: House Judiciary Committee Republicans

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Last week, Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and nineteen of the other twenty-three Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee, sent a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions requesting that he appoint a second special counsel (in addition to Robert Mueller).  The list of things the Republicans want investigated is long, running to fourteen items, including Hillary Clinton’s e-mails and the investigation thereof, former Attorney General Loretta Lynch, former FBI Director James Comey, Mr. Trump’s post-election claims “that he was wiretapped by the previous administration,” and – this one is particularly rich – “inappropriate collusion between the DNC and the Clinton campaign to undermine Senator Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaign.”

This is, of course, not a serious document written by or for serious people.  It is instead a grab-bag compilation of pre- and post-election conspiracy theories and Trump Administration talking points aimed at deflecting attention from the Mueller investigation.  The letter is unaccompanied by any evidence that the events listed actually happened, or any legal argument that, if they did, the alleged misconduct amounted to criminal offenses.

For example, the first two items on the list — that former AG Lynch encouraged then-FBI Director Comey to “mislead the American people” by insisting that he refer to the Clinton investigation as a “matter,” and the “shadow cast over our system of justice concerning Secretary Clinton and her involvement in mishandling classified information” — are ludicrous as action items in a letter seeking a criminal investigation.  If Ms. Lynch did make this request to Mr. Comey, it would indicate that she was trying to minimize the political damage of the FBI probe to Secretary Clinton, but that is not a crime.  And federal prosecutors, whether regular or special, do not investigate non-crimes.  Nor does the Department of Justice investigate “shadows” over justice systems.

The letter is doubly frivolous in that few, if any, of the matters listed — even if they happened and were colorably criminal — would require a “special counsel.”

If Mr. Trump suspects he was “wiretapped” by the FBI, the NSA, the CIA, or any other federal agency, all he has to do is order the appointed heads of those agencies to inquire of their own subordinates.  If former Department of Justice officials are alleged to have behaved improperly, that would be a matter for the Department’s own Inspector General.  The need for a “special counsel” would arise only if politically appointed senior DOJ officials would have conflicts of interest in overseeing an investigation that could not be dealt with by individual recusal.  The only items on the list that might arguably fall into this category are the two or three proposing investigation into the foreign connections of the Clinton Foundation.  Such an investigation, though not presenting a conflict of interest under DOJ regulations, might call for a special counsel if the Attorney General concluded that investigating his boss’s former political adversary would present an appearance of impropriety.

But that, of course, is the most troublesome part of the Goodlatte letter.  Because — absent the most compelling evidence of criminality — such an investigation would be improper.  In the United States, successful candidates for political office do not use their newly-acquired powers to prosecute their defeated opponents.  That is a key marker of incipient authoritarianism.  The fact that twenty Republican lawmakers – virtually all of whom are lawyers – do not understand this most elemental of democratic political norms is profoundly disheartening.

It should also be a reality check for those hopeful that, given compelling evidence of impeachable conduct, Congress will act to remove Mr. Trump.  The sad fact is that, at least on the House side, Congress is not performing the role assigned it by the Framers of providing an institutional check on presidential misbehavior.  Indeed, particularly on the House side,  congressmen are actively enabling Mr. Trump’s misbehavior and thus actively abetting the steady degradation of the constitutional norms that have made the country work.  The Goodlatte letter represents a new low in this calamitous political degeneracy.

No president can be impeached unless a majority of the House of Representatives endorses that result.  Sadly, I think it fair to conclude that no kind or degree of deviancy or outrageousness will move a Republican House to impeach him, at least so long as Mr. Trump retains the loyalty of his Republican base.  And Mr. Trump continues to be supported by more than 80% of Republican voters.

Is Pursuit of Removal by the 25th Amendment “Sanist?”

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Click here to read an article written by Professor Procknow of Toronto who claims that talk of removing President Trump for his alleged insanity is sanist. (Warning: this article has a partisan slant).

lead_960.jpgKevin Lamarque / Reuters

However low he goes, we must stay high: Pondering right — and wrong — ways to impeach a president

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Over the past several weeks, I’ve been writing and talking a lot on this blog and in the popular media about technical legal stuff — emoluments, the application of obstruction of justice statutes in the special case of presidents, whether a president can pardon himself, whether Donald Trump, Jr. violated federal election laws by meeting with the Russians, the procedural hurdles that stand between Special Counsel Robert Mueller and indictment or impeachment, and the relatively limited power of state attorneys general to investigate a president.

In looking back, I find that a recurring theme has been that Trump’s opponents sometimes seem willing to stretch the the letter of the law or traditional expectations about proper governmental behavior in order get at Mr. Trump.  My task has often been to say, “No, the law can’t be read as elastically as you would like,” or “No, the aggressive action you want to see is not consistent with the role of prosecutors in America.”

To which those who see in Mr. Trump a mortal danger to democracy might reply, “Well, yes, possibly.  But Trump is an extraordinary threat requiring extraordinary measures. Musty old maxims about strictly construing penal statutes in favor of the defendant and antique conceptions of prosecutorial restraint shouldn’t bind us in the face of an existential threat.”

Indeed, at least a few of the comments posted on Slate and the Wall Street Journal essentially say, “This Bowman guy should just shut up if all he’s going to talk about is what can’t be done.”

I am sympathetic to the sentiment behind these reactions.  I yield to no one in my disapproval of Mr. Trump.  Better wordsmiths than I have worn out their thesauruses in search of language that would adequately describe his seemingly limitless personal defects and his utter unsuitability for the office he holds.

And yet…

Those who oppose Mr. Trump need to think very carefully about why they oppose him and about the remedies that are appropriate to the ground of their opposition.

First, it is undeniable that he can, and will, do a great deal of damage so long as he remains in office.  But much of what his most ardent opponents view as damage will come in the form of policies — legally enacted by statute or regulation — that may be anathema to liberals and even most moderates, but which are neither more nor less than the long-stated platform of the modern Republican Party.  However much one may disagree with the particulars of the Republican agenda, its enactment by constitutionally elected officials is not a constitutional crisis.

  • Rejecting climate science is stupid and pulling out of the Paris climate accords is foolish, but neither choice offends the constitution.
  • Tax cuts for the rich as the perennial solution for every ill may be lousy economics, but as Justice Holmes once observed, the constitution does not guarantee the ascendance of any particular social or economic theory.
  • Building a “great border wall” is a comically ineffectual symbolic substitute for a real immigration policy, but, as much as the left may want to deny it, there are serious arguments for more restrictive and more selective immigration laws.
  • Jeff Sessions (however long he may last) is dragging federal law enforcement back into the morass of excessive punitiveness that even most conservatives have begun to abandon, but in doing so he is only enforcing laws Congress has not seen fit to alter.
  • Repealing or crippling the Affordable Care Act is both profoundly inhumane and (I venture to predict) terrible politics, but the country survived for over two centuries without the ACA, and the country will muddle along somehow if, despite this morning’s dramatic vote against “skinny repeal,” the Republicans nonetheless manage to mangle it.

I could go on, but the point is that the bad policy Mr. Trump and a Republican congress may enact is only that – bad policy.  For over two centuries the constitution has provided the institutional framework for enacting countless bad policies … and the framework for fixing many of them. The proper response to bad policy is democratic politics — not impeachment of the elected president who espouses it.  And, as has often been noted, removal of Mr. Trump merely puts Vice President Pence in the Oval Office, and Mr. Pence is, if anything, a more ardent and perhaps more competent exponent of extreme conservative policy positions.

Second, the very real danger Mr. Trump poses to the Republic stems primarily from his own peculiar persona, but even there his opponents should be cautious.  For example, many properly despise Mr. Trump for his boastful misogyny — at least outside the tiny circle of his own family he obviously views women as either sex toys or servants. But Democrats are poorly situated to find that attitude — or even conduct consistent with it — disqualifying in a president. On this score at least there is not much to choose between Bill Clinton and Donald Trump, or for that matter between Trump and other heroes of the liberal past like John Kennedy.  Indeed, on this score Mr. Trump comes off rather better than they in that, despite his crudity, he has not, so far as we know, turned the White House into his personal libidinous hunting ground.  And Democrats spent the late 1990s arguing that actual adulterous sex in the White House and perjury about the adultery is not disqualifying in a president.

Many of Mr. Trump’s other manifest personal defects are not without presidential precedent. Those old enough will recall Lyndon Johnson’s petty cruelties like the repeated humiliation of Vice President Hubert Humphrey.  Woodrow Wilson was a candid racist, and even an otherwise pretty decent guy like the first President Bush was not above fanning racial insecurities to win an election. Trump’s happy ignorance of science and economics will be sadly familiar to anyone who lived through the Reagan years, and his blithe disregard of facts as a guide to policy making finds a recent echo in the second President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq.

One might fairly respond that Trump is different because, although each of his predecessors had unsavory traits, he embodies in a single man virtually all the undesirable characteristics of many presidential generations, with virtually none of their virtues.  And he carries some common presidential weaknesses, like lying, to previously unimaginable extremes.  I would be hard pressed to disagree.  Yet the sad truth is none of Mr. Trump’s traits was a secret before the election.  America knew who he was, and elected him anyway.  Being a miserable human being is not an impeachable offense.

A president should only be impeached if his continuation in office represents a genuine threat to the security of the country or the constitutional order.  That said, any reasonable observer must have concerns about Mr. Trump on both grounds.

He is proudly ignorant and — regardless of whether he fits into diagnostic criteria for mental illness — impetuous, vindictive, and unstable.  Having such a person at the helm of a world hyperpower is deeply dangerous to the security of the United States and the peace of the world.  But it is unclear how a duly elected president can be removed for being psychologically unfit for the job.  The 25th Amendment might technically apply, but triggering it would require the assent of the majority of the cabinet Trump himself appointed.  Perhaps personal instability is impeachable, but at least if we take constitutional language and limited precedent seriously, impeachment for a “high crime or misdemeanor” would seem to require some consequential presidential act manifesting the fundamental instability.  I will return to this point in later posts.

But the main thrust of today’s epistle is that the most likely and constitutionally supportable grounds for impeachment of Mr. Trump will arise from behavior that violates the law or disregards the unwritten standards of conduct  — which lawyers and philosophers and social science types give the fancy name “norms” –without which the rule of law cannot function.

It is because I believe Mr. Trump threatens the rule of law that I started to write this blog.  My fear does not – so far -center on concern that Mr. Trump will act in direct defiance of plain legal rules.  It arises from daily observation of his incessant and accelerating attacks on the unwritten norms that keep the legal and political process honest and make the rules work.

  • No law requires disclosure of presidential tax returns or divestment of presidential assets, but the obvious virtue of preventing conflicts of interest in the nation’s highest official has, until Trump, made disclosure and divestment (or management in blind trusts) the universal norm.
  • No law, with the debatable exception of the emoluments clauses, requires that a president refrain from blatant profiteering off of his official position, but the obvious taint of corruption that attaches to such behavior has meant that, until Trump, the emoluments clauses have never in over two centuries been a live issue.
  • No law requires a president to be scrupulously honest all the time, but the obvious benefit of enjoying credibility with the public, the courts, political friends and adversaries, has, until Trump, meant that presidents try hard to tell the truth most of the time and don’t lie to everyone, every day, about so many subjects that the chief executive’s word becomes effectively worthless.
  • No law bars a newly-elected president from urging the criminal prosecution of his defeated opponent, but the obvious danger of transforming a democratic state into a tyrannical banana republic has, until Trump, put such vindictiveness beyond serious contemplation.
  • No law requires that presidents scrupulously avoid direct intervention in federal criminal investigations, but the obvious virtue of avoiding even the appearance that a president is shielding himself or his friends, or using the criminal law to persecute political enemies, has made Justice Department independence a norm presidents challenge at their peril.

It is Mr. Trump’s violation of these and an ever-growing host of other norms that makes him dangerous.  A violator of law can be punished by the courts and the sanctity of law thus upheld. Norms are different.  However sacred we may thoughtlessly have assumed them to be, violating them incurs no necessary sanction, certainly none that can be enforced by courts and bailiffs.  Nonetheless, if norms are disregarded with impunity, then they lose all effect.  How then ought we to respond to Mr. Trumps unremitting assault on the norms of civil society?

Norms are enforced informally, through communal disapproval, which in politics most commonly translates into electoral defeat.  In extreme cases, sufficiently egregious violations of core democratic norms may properly trigger the constitution’s impeachment remedy and allow an injured nation to remove an offender before his term expires.  I plan to talk a lot in coming weeks and months about how Mr. Trump’s violations of democratic norms may qualify as impeachable offenses.

But those who would impeach a president for his disregard of democratic norms must come to the task with clean hands. It will not do to say that, because Trump flaunts some norms, other norms can justifiably be bent or broken to bring him low. If that becomes the stance of Trump’s pursuers, then they become little better than the object of their indignation, and what should be a righteous pursuit will seem no more than partisan vindictiveness. Which will degrade the very standards of conduct we should all be seeking to uphold, and lead, inevitably, to yet another round of bitter political warfare conducted with even fewer restraints and less decency.

If that happens, those who oppose Mr. Trump will have failed utterly, even if they succeed in expelling him from office.

If Mr. Trump is to be removed, it must be for reasons and employing procedures to which there can be no fair-minded objection. To paraphrase a rather more admirable public figure from what already seems an antique golden era, “However low he may go, we must stay high.”

 

 

The Pre-Watergate Impeachment Attempt

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Click here to read an account of a pre-Watergate impeachment attempt on President Nixon. This story includes some interesting parallels to our modern controversy, including tension between the press and the blue-collar worker.

press.jpgWilliam E. Sauro/The New York Times