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Impeachable Offenses?

~ Examining the Case for Removal of the 45th President of the United States

Impeachable Offenses?

Tag Archives: lying

Mueller Denies BuzzFeed Report

19 Saturday Jan 2019

Posted by crosbysamuel in Articles, Uncategorized

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buzzfeed, Collusion, Congress, deny, dishonest, donald, Frank Bowman, impeachable, Impeachment, lie, lying, Michael Cohen, moscow, president, report, Robert Mueller, russia, Russian, slate, trump, Trump Tower

Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s office has issued a rare statement denying the veracity of the BuzzFeed article published yesterday. The article in question stated that Mueller’s office had a cache of documents which established that President Trump encouraged his former attorney, Michael Cohen, to lie about the extent of the Moscow Trump Tower negotiations. If that were true, the legal consequences would have been severe; Professor Frank Bowman provided an analysis which was published on Slate.com.

However, though BuzzFeed has dug in its heels, the rarity of such public statements from Mueller’s office and its direct nature seem to indicate that there is no truth to the story. That is to say, Mueller’s office does not have hard evidence of such directions exchanged between Trump and Cohen. There is some concern that this revelation will give the President new ammunition against the media; however, it should not be forgotten that the truth finder of most significance in this case is Robert Mueller. It should be heartening that he is staying the course.

UT5EXCA3QYI6TCATZOO6Y5Q6OM.jpgRichard Drew/AP

 

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If When he Denies he Lies…

14 Monday Jan 2019

Posted by crosbysamuel in Articles, Uncategorized

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Conspiracy, denial, dishonest, donald trump, finland, impeach, Impeachment, interpreter, investigation, lies, lying, Mueller, president, public trust, Putin, russia, russian collusion, vladmir putin

President Trump today denied that he has worked for Russia in what has been described as his “most direct response” to the accusations of collusion. This denial came in the wake of a report that after a meeting he had with Russian President Vladmir Putin last summer in Finland, Trump took their interpreter’s notes and instructed him not to discuss the meeting with any other officials.

One theory is of course that Trump did work for, or at least with, Russia, which if true means that what he said today was a lie. Which begs the question, what consequences may come to a President for lying to the public? Professor Bowman has written at length on this subject, and his writings can be found here. However, in the way of summary, Prof. Bowman noted three kinds of lies which he believes could warrant impeachment: criminally indictable falsehoods,  unindictable official falsehoods, and chronic or pervasive falsehoods. The lie at hand is neither indictable or official, as it was not given under oath and is not a communication with Congress. However, the lie could fit in the third category if added to the pool of President Trump’s many other falsehoods, which, in aggregate, Bowman has suggested, are potentially impeachable. He wrote: “chronic presidential lies do not merely render the president himself ineffectual, but also damage every other branch and function of American government.” In essence, Trump’s constant lies are one of the things which make him unfit. For an in-depth analysis of this novel idea, the reader should check out Bowman’s article, which can be found here.

ap_19014539944750_wide-234bee0b5652fad844256e61c76821ab6b04c988-s1600-c85.jpgEvan Vucci/AP

 

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Manafort Lied about Dealings with Kilimnik

09 Wednesday Jan 2019

Posted by crosbysamuel in Articles, Uncategorized

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Collusion, Conspiracy, conspiracy to defraud, conspire, donald trump, impeachable, Impeachment, konstantin kilimnik, lie, lying, madrid, paul manafort, polling data, president, Robert Mueller, russian collusion, russian intelligence, Special Counsel, ukraine, witness tampering

Special Counsel Robert Mueller believes that Paul Manafort, former Trump campaign chairmen, shared polling data with Konstantin Kilimnik, a Ukranian translator and campaign adviser believed to have ties with Russian intelligence, and that he later lied about it. Apparently, Manafort’s lawyers have conceded that Manafort neglected certain details of his Ukrainian dealings, as they wrote in a court filing that “[i]t is not surprising at all that Mr. Manafort was unable to recall specific details prior to having his recollection refreshed.” The filing also notes that Manafort forgot  and later recalled that he had met with Kilimnik in Madrid in January or February of 2017, which was after Trump became President-elect, but also after Manafort’s tenure as campaign chairmen. Manafort and Kilimnik have previously been accused of witness tampering, for allegedly reaching out to members of the Hapsburg group, and asking them to lie about secret, pro-Ukrainian lobbying done at Manafort’s behest.

If it is to be believed that Kilimnik does have ties to Russian intelligence, then this information establishes, at least, a Russian interest in President Trump’s candidacy. Of course, that is not new information. At most, it could go to establishing communication between Trump and Russia post-election. That being said, it is only circumstantial evidence. The fact that foreign powers are interested in Trump’s nomination and presidency, does not mean he cooperated with foreign powers, and the fact that Manafort cooperated with foreign powers, does not mean that Trump participated. Still, this another straw on the camel’s back.

gettyimages-975251610_wide-a5b8c154718a06791ada3f9447c359251dd114b5.jpgAFP/Getty Images

 

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Manafort Flips Again

27 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by crosbysamuel in Articles, Uncategorized

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campaign chairman, Collusion, Conspiracy, impeachable offense, Impeachment, indictment, lying, pardon, paul manafort, plea agreement, president, Robert Mueller, russia, russians, Special Counsel, trump, wikileaks

Special Counsel Robert Mueller has submitted court filings indicating that his team will not be recommending that Paul Manafort’s, President Trump’s former campaign chairman, sentence be reduced as previously considered, because Manafort has not been cooperative with his investigation. Manafort plead guilty to two counts of conspiracy pursuant to a deal he made with prosecutors; however, contrary to that agreement, Manafort has been lying to authorities (about some unspecified things). David S. Weinstein, a former federal prosecutor, believes Manafort’s lack of cooperation may be due to a belief that he will ultimately receive a pardon for his crimes. The consequences of such a pardon and similar pardons have previously been considered on this blog.

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A Look Back at the Clinton Impeachment

30 Thursday Nov 2017

Posted by impeachableoffenses in Uncategorized

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adultery, Bill Clinton, clinton impeachment, impeachable offenses, Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr, lying, lying as impeachable offense, Politics

While rummaging around in some old files, I came across the item below, originally published in the December 22, 1998 edition of The Champion, the magazine of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  In it, assuming the character of a congressman voting on articles of impeachment for President Bill Clinton, I laid out my views about the events of that turbulent period.  Readers, particularly those whose political memory doesn’t extend back that far, may find it of some interest. For me, it serves as a useful reminder that a credible case for the impeachment of Mr. Trump must steer clear of the politics of personal destruction that rendered the Clinton impeachment effort illegitimate.

Against Impeachment: An Imagined Argument in the House Judiciary Committee

Editor’s Note: On October 12, 1998, the faculty at Gonzaga University Law School staged a mock impeachment hearing before the House Judiciary Committee. Professors played the roles of Committee members arguing for and against forwarding the full House three proposed Articles of Impeachment [President Clinton] with perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power. Professor Frank Bowman spoke in the character of a congressman opposed to impeachment. His remarks follow.

When I began thinking about what I would say here, I was angry. Angry mostly with two monumentally selfish men — one without honor, the other without judgment. Angry with a President, who with all his gifts — talent, intelligence, charm, and the ultimate gift of power given by the people of this country — could not restrain his sexual appetites, and then — when the day came that his failure was discovered, lied — and lied repeatedly — to cover it up.

Angry, equally, with the President’s pursuer, a man of nearly equal gifts, who has proven to be a smiling keyhole-peeping zealot, smugly convinced of his own righteousness, using the law’s tools, but refusing to be bound by its limits, fixated blindly on his quarry, determined to bring him down at last by whatever means.

Two men, locked together, clawing at one another, each so obsessed with personal vindication that neither has spared a thought for the damage they do, day by day, to the country they claim to serve. In the end, neither of them can win. Indeed both have already lost. Both crave the favorable judgment of history.

Neither will receive it. No matter what we do here, whether the President is removed or serves out his term, William Clinton and Kenneth Starr are already condemned to spend the remainder of their lives in a very public purgatory: the President disgraced, his adversary despised, both of them endlessly — and vainly — seeking to justify their actions of the past year. They are lost men, though they seem not to know it, and it is pointless to be angry with them.

The facts are that the Independent Counsel has made his referral, and the President will not resign. So the resolution of this great tragedy is no longer in their hands, but in ours. How this crisis in the life of the Republic should be resolved depends a good deal less on arguments about who they are, than on a choice we must make about who we are, as a nation and as a political community. Who did the Founders intend us to be? Who have we been throughout our history? What kind of public life together do we want to have for our lives and the lives of our children?

To begin at the beginning, we Americans are creatures of our written Constitution. If the ancient Israelites were the People of the Book, we are the People of the Constitution. The Constitution gave us a particular kind of government, with a unique and particular sort of chief executive — a President whose power does not rest on a parliamentary majority, but arises by direct grant from the popular vote of all the people. A President who serves, not at the pleasure of the legislature, but for fixed terms. A President who can be removed only one way, by impeachment for the commission of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”

Those who favor the removal of this President are prone to abbreviate the constitutional language, to speak only of the rather mysterious phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,” without mentioning the fact that the Constitution has given us two concrete examples — treason and bribery — of the type of offense the Framers intended to be proper grounds for impeachment. When the Constitution speaks of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” it is saying that a President may be removed if he commits treason, takes or gives bribes, or commits other acts similar both in type and seriousness to bribery and treason.

From this we can fairly infer two things:

First, a “high crime or misdemeanor” is an offense of the most serious kind. Treason is punishable by death. And bribery is everywhere thought of as among the gravest of non-violent offenses.

Second, impeachable offenses are public crimes, crimes that strike at the heart of the democratic order. As Alexander Hamilton said in Number 65 of The Federalist, they are “of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL [and he capitalized the word “political”], as they relate chiefly to the injuries done to the society itself.”

In the present case, the President had an adulterous affair, and then he lied to cover it up. In my view, neither adultery nor lying to conceal it compares even remotely in seriousness to treason or bribery. Indeed, though adultery is often, and lying about it under oath always,criminal, and both occur routinely in every jurisdiction in the land, neither is ever prosecuted. People cheat on their spouses every day. And they lie about it, in divorce court, in child custody proceedings, in sexual harassment cases. And while they may lose their civil lawsuits, they are never prosecuted for perjury about their sex lives. In short, in every courthouse across America, adultery and its concealment rank below driving without a license and overtime parking in the amount of resources the nation’s prosecutors and judges are willing to devote to stamping them out.

Two Errors

But, I hear my learned Republican friends protesting that this is different. The President is the Chief Executive, sworn to support and defend both the Constitution and all the laws of the land. When he breaks the law, he violates a public trust. If the President breaks the law, and we do not impeach him, then, say my Republican friends, we “abandon the rule of law.” This argument rests on two fundamental errors.

First, the argument assumes that impeachment is the only remedy the law provides for a President who breaks it. Not so. As Alexander Hamilton said of those who actually are impeached, “After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.” The same is true of those who commit crimes, but are not removed from office on that account.

In other words, a refusal to impeach does not mean a refusal to punish. If the President did indeed commit perjury or obstruction of justice, nothing bars his prosecution for those offenses once he leaves office. It is remarkably telling that those who profess such deep concern about preserving the “rule of law” are so unwilling to let the law’s ordinary processes work. The truth is that the President’s opponents shun the ordinary process of law in favor of the uniquely political process of impeachment, because they rightly fear that no ordinary prosecutor would indict this President and no ordinary jury would convict him.

The second flaw in the contention that failure to impeach equals abandonment of the rule of law is that it ignores our most fundamental law: the Constitution itself. The Constitution does not say that any criminal violation, or even any felony, by the Chief Executive is grounds for impeachment. Had the Framers wanted to say that, they certainly knew how. Their numbers included some of the finest lawyers and legal draftsmen in our history. The Constitution says that impeachment follows only from the commission of especially serious, peculiarly public crimes — “treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors.” My conservative friends — who are usually so insistent on giving the Constitution its plain meaning — want to bootstrap their way around this inconvenient language by contending that the President’s official obligation to enforce the law renders any significant violation of the law by the President himself a breach of trust grave enough to require impeachment. To agree with them is to say that, for a President, “high crimes and misdemeanors” means nothing more than any violation, or perhaps any felony violation, of the criminal code.

In sum, I cannot consent to the impeachment of this President on these charges because to do so would be, if not absolutely unconstitutional, at least anti-constitutional, in the sense that it would run contrary to what I think the Founders intended. The crimes alleged against the President are neither sufficiently grave, nor sufficiently “Political” — as Alexander Hamilton conceived the term — to merit impeachment. As one of our House colleagues recently said: “The President betrayed his wife. He did not betray the country. God help us if we cannot tell the difference.”

And yet, like my Republican friends, I am profoundly troubled by a President who lies under oath, however private the subject matter of the lie. I am profoundly troubled by a President who lets his subordinates lie for him. Who silently condones the conduct of his lawyers when they pass misleading information on to a court. If this is not impeachable behavior, it is certainly close. I am indeed sufficiently troubled, and feel sufficiently betrayed, by my President, that I might almost swallow my constitutional scruples and vote for impeachment, were it not for the fact that I believe to do so would compound the injury that Mr. Starr and Mr. Clinton have together inflicted on the country.

In the end, I cannot vote for impeachment because to do so would place the stamp of approval on the increasing viciousness of our politics. It would sanction the incestuous marriage of law and politics that has transformed all holders of high office into the automatic targets of a secular inquisition. I detest what President Clinton has done. I fear what the process that pursued him will do to what is left of our public life if it is not stopped.

The President’s opponents say, with every indication of sincerity, “It is not the President’s adultery that concerns us. It’s the lying. The lying in the deposition. The lying in the grand jury. The lying to the public.” Curiously, perhaps, I find the reverse to be true. What is to me incomprehensible and nearly unforgivable is the adultery itself. The betrayal of the man’s wife and daughter. The selfishness and sheer reckless stupidity of seeking physical gratification with this young woman in this place, not just once, but over and over again. But being a cad and a fool are not impeachable offenses. And so we hear about the perjury.

Original Sin

The problem is that while the adultery was the President’s failing alone, an original sin without which nothing that has happened since could have happened, the crimes for which his opponents would impeach him are the lies about the sin. And those crimes were largely manufactured for the express purpose of destroying the President. I know, and I hear some of my colleagues saying, it was Bill Clinton, not his opponents who chose to lie. That is true. These crimes of falsehood were “manufactured” not in the sense that the President did not commit them. They were manufactured because, once evidence of the original sin began to surface, it was the constant project of the President’s opponents to place him in situations where either a lie or the truth would destroy him.

Consider the Paula Jones lawsuit. Whatever its substantive merits, it was made possible by massive financial support from an ultra-conservative legal foundation, support one suspects did not arise because of a deep commitment to the rights of women or expansive interpretations of sexual harassment legislation. We now know that Linda Tripp met both with Starr’s prosecutors and Paula Jones’ lawyers before the President’s deposition in the Jones civil suit. The Jones lawyers sprung the Lewinsky questions on the President without warning in the midst of his deposition.

For its part, Starr’s office sprang into furious, but entirely secret, action: On January 12, 1998, Linda Tripp met with Starr’s people, who took her illegally recorded conversations with Lewinsky, and immediately wired her for more chats with her “friend.” On January 15, two days before the President’s scheduled deposition in the Jones case, Starr secretly obtained from Janet Reno permission to apply for expansion of his jurisdiction to investigate what he was already investigating. On the 16th Starr secretly secured expanded authority from the Court. On the same day, the day before the President’s deposition, Starr virtually abducted Monica Lewinsky, holding her incommunicado in a Washington area hotel, threatening her with decades of prison time if she did not cooperate and telling her that any cooperation deal was off if she called her lawyer. It was only after the President had testified, and told his first fatal lie, that Starr’s new focus was publicly disclosed. The implication is unmistakable. Starr’s office wanted, nay desperately hoped, that the President would lie. Because then they would have him — at long last. And so they scurried about in the dark, praying the President would fall into their trap.

It is easy to condemn the President for lying in the Jones case, and I certainly do not condone it. On the other hand, given that he had committed adultery with a woman half his age, what were his choices? He could tell the truth, and destroy his marriage, his relationship with his daughter, his Presidency, and not incidentally the life of Ms. Lewinsky. (For her life truly is destroyed. For the rest of her life, and for as long as this Republic lasts, she will be a dirty joke, an obscene footnote.) Or he could lie and hope for the best. He chose to lie, thus transforming a sin into a crime and giving his enemies the weapon they needed.

Since the initial lie, everything else has unfolded with miserable inevitability. Having lied once, the President had few options. To admit the lie was to confess perjury. To persist in denial was to court charges of obstruction. The dilemma came to a head when he was subpoenaed to the grand jury. Here was the second manufactured crime. It is against Justice Department policy to subpoena targets of an investigation to testify. The Department recognizes that it is unfair to force a target to assert his right against self-incrimination in front of the very same grand jury considering his indictment. However, Mr. Starr has never felt himself bound by the constraints that govern ordinary prosecutors. He knew that for political reasons, the President could not refuse to appear. He also knew that, to that point in his investigation, all he had was adultery and evasive answers to questions in a legally dubious civil lawsuit. So he set the perjury trap.

Once before the grand jury, the President could not possibly invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. Having agreed to testify, whatever he said would be used as evidence of perjury. If he denied the adultery, that would be perjury. If he admitted it, that would be confessing he committed perjury in the Jones case. So he danced, stuck to his silly definition of sexual relations, probably lied again, and colluded in the manufacture of yet another charge against him. And here we are.

All this having been said, my disappointment in this President is so great that, if I thought his downfall would end the story, allowing the country to move forward and heal its wounds, I would consent to his removal. But I cannot see that happy ending.

We, all of us, have created an engine for the destruction of public figures. It has grown slowly, its many components, often beneficial in themselves, falling together largely by accident. But it is upon us, it is devouring us, and it must be stopped.

We have passed an ever-more-comprehensive set of laws that make virtually every sort of unpleasant, unethical, or merely boorish behavior a legal cause of action. We have approved rules of civil discovery that allow intrusive questioning into the most collateral matters. We have laws against perjury and false statement that are seldom used, but always available. We have an independent counsel statute that confers on unelected and ungovernable proconsuls the power to pursue our highest public officers for any real or suspected transgression of the monstrous federal criminal code. We have well-funded advocacy groups at both extremes of the political spectrum who are beyond political control and who will use any available legal or public relations tool to demonize and destroy those they perceive as their enemies.

In combination, these many apparently unrelated developments permit the extremists of both parties to pull down their opponents, with a tacit nod from those of us who claim to be moderates. The strategy is plain. Find a mistake or personal weakness. If it is already criminal, call for an independent counsel. If not criminal yet, file a civil lawsuit or start a congressional investigation. If no direct evidence of criminality is unearthed, get the target under oath. Force the victim to admit indiscretions that will ruin him, or to lie and commit perjury.

The casualty list from this escalating cycle of political warfare is growing. As is the desire for tit-for-tat revenge. John Tower, Jim Wright, Clarence Thomas, Henry Cisneros, Newt Gingrich, and now the President himself. This old Republic has survived many things — world wars and civil wars, social upheaval and civil unrest. I am not sure it can withstand the prolonged criminalization of political life. From time to time truly bad people enter public office and must be removed. But the focus of public life cannot be on the private character of public people.

Ideas Not Personalities

The flaws in the private character of this President have been of the more obvious and titillating kind. But few lives could withstand the relentless scrutiny to which his life has been subjected. We, all of us, have to stop. We have to give up the notion that we profit by the personal devastation of our political opponents. We have to abandon the idea that political disagreements are the occasion for a moral jihad. We have to relearn one of the central tenets of representative democracy — that our long national conversation is about ideas, not personalities, that we can disagree with one another on the most fundamental points without hating each other, without seeking one another’s destruction.

In the end, this President should not be impeached, not because he deserves salvation, but because we do.

Postscript: At the conclusion of the mock hearing, the audience of students, faculty and members of the public, voted 109-90 against approving the articles of impeachment against the President.

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Institutional Corruption and Public Trust

20 Sunday Aug 2017

Posted by crosbysamuel in Articles, Uncategorized

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corruption, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, lying, public trust

“Because institutions rely on public trust to fulfill their purposes, loss of trust in institutions constitutes institutional corruption, as it harms the ability for institutions to achieve their purposes.”

This article from the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal examines institutional corruption and its influence on the effectiveness of government. An aspect of institutional corruption is loss of public trust, as is highlighted in the excerp above. One might consider this as an additional consequence of President Trump’s lying, as examined in Professor Bowman’s recent posts. 

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Lying as an impeachable offense – Part II: Unindictable official falsehoods

18 Friday Aug 2017

Posted by impeachableoffenses in Uncategorized

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Gulf of Tonkin, impeachment for lying, Iredell, lies, lying, nixon, Tonkin resolution, unindictable official falsehoods, unindictable official lies

In my last post, I noted that Mr. Trump has an historically unique propensity for falsehood and I began considering the question of whether a president can properly be impeached for lying.  In that post, I addressed the impeachability of criminally indictable forms of lying.  Here, I consider whether lies that are part of official communications with Congress, but are not indictable, can be impeachable offenses.

James Iredell, one of the first Supreme Court justices, speaking of the impeachment clauses during the North Carolina debates about ratifying the constitution, said that “The President must certainly be punishable for giving false information to the Senate.”  Although he was speaking of the particular situation in which a president was seeking senatorial approval of treaties or other foreign projects, the general principle he espoused was that the legislature as a coordinate branch of government is entitled to rely on a president’s honesty — and can impeach him if he willfully misinforms them on important matters.

There is at least one historical example of an attempt to impeach a president for lying to congress.

Article V of the proposed articles of impeachment of Richard Nixon charged concealment of the bombing of Cambodia through the creation of false military documents.  The House Judiciary Committee did not approve this article, although as I wrote some years ago, its decision not to do so:

probably resulted from a disinclination to inject the explosive politics of the Vietnam War into a case where ample ground for impeachment already existed, rather than a rejection of the principle that the Chief Executive may not intentionally deceive Congress in matters that relate to the legislature’s own constitutional duties.

In my judgment, it would be entirely consistent with the language and purpose of the impeachment clauses to impeach a president for telling congress material falsehoods on subjects that could affect legislative action.  Falsehoods of this sort could include both personal statements of the president or, as in the case of President Nixon, the submission to congress of agency testimony or reports the president knew to contain material untruths.

That said, precisely defining the types of presidential statements to the legislature that could plausibly be deemed impeachable is difficult.

Lies to congress by the president himself in a formal, official communication

The easiest case would arise if a president himself were to lie when speaking formally to congress or one of its committees in person or in writing in an effort to obtain a congressional decision on a matter where congressional action depended on the truth of the president’s statement.  This is the case Iredell and, two centuries later, the Nixon-era Judiciary Committee had in mind.

Another historical example of lies of this kind that might plausibly have been characterized as an impeachable offense would be the misstatements and omissions by President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara about encounters between U.S. and North Vietnamese naval vessels on August 2-4, 1964, that led to the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and in turn to deepening U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

To make a long story short, in 1964, U.S. naval vessels were operating in the Gulf of Tonkin in support of South Vietnamese military operations against North Vietnamese military installations. On August 2, three North Vietnamese gunboats responded to one such South Vietnamese operation by attacking a supporting U.S. destroyer, the USS Maddox. The Maddox, in concert with U.S. aircraft, then sunk or damaged all three.  On the night of August 4, the Maddox thought it was attacked again, and responded by firing profusely at a variety of unidentified targets. There were strong indications even at the time that the August 4 “attack” was actually an overreaction to misinterpreted sonar data and that the US Navy was shooting at empty ocean.  In later years, this suspicion hardened to a virtual certainty.

Nonetheless, Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson publicly characterized the events of August 2-4 as two unprovoked attacks on blameless U.S. naval vessels.  In addition to over-hyping the probably non-existent August 4 “attack,” they carefully concealed the fact that the U.S. ships came into the line of fire because they were supporting South Vietnamese assaults on the North.  President Johnson sought from Congress, and got, the famous “Tonkin Gulf resolution” which he used as legal justification for taking the U.S. ever deeper into what became the Vietnam War.

No less an authority than current National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster concluded that Johnson and McNamara “deceived the American people and Congress” about the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

This type of potentially impeachable presidential falsehood might occur in a formal written message from the president to Congress, such as the one LBJ sent on August 5, 1964.  Or it might occur in a personal address like the annual State of Union message.  There could be no doubt of the official character of either form of communication.  In the first, the president is expressly asking for congressional action.  In the second, the president’s obligation to provide a message to congress regarding the state of the union is written into Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Of course, as the modern practice of “fact-checking” every presidential address has made plain, every president spins facts to his advantage at least somewhat on such occasions. It would be absurd to impeach a president for engaging in that well-understood political habit. Nonetheless, there must be some limit on presidential prevarication in official settings.  It is one thing for a president to place politically advantageous interpretations on ambiguous facts, or even to cherry-pick facts a bit to support a political argument.  It is quite another for a president to consciously misrepresent facts plainly germane to a congressional choice, or to consciously omit facts that, if revealed, might cause congress to act differently.

Lies to congress by administration agencies or officials with the president’s knowledge

A second type of potentially impeachable presidential lie to Congress occurred when the Nixon Administration submitted to Congress false reports about Cambodian bombing. There the president did not personally speak, but, at least so it was alleged, he caused or authorized his subordinates to deceive Congress on his behalf.  Again, every administration is going to try to bend the arc of truth a bit in the direction of its ideological or policy preferences, but even in this age of relativism there must be some boundary beyond which a president cannot go when authorizing official communications to a coordinate branch of the United States government.

This sort of executive branch misrepresentation could become relevant to the current administration.  For example, by law, the executive branch must, every four years, prepare and publish a “National Climate Assessment,” which is expressly designed to set out the best available science to guide congress, executive branch regulators, and state and local governments in making decisions about how to respond to the changing global climate.  Government scientists and career professionals were sufficiently concerned about whether the Trump Administration might either alter or suppress its findings that a draft was recently leaked to the press.  The availability of the draft may forestall any significant meddling with the report’s data or basic conclusions, but this is only one of many legally mandated reports and data compilations that might be subject to politically-motivated censorship.

The question – for which I confess I have no easy answer – is whether there is a type and degree of suppression or distortion of reports to Congress that would properly amount to an impeachable offense.  To constitute to an impeachable offense, such a report would certainly have to satisfy at least three requirements: (1) It would concern a matter of genuine national significance upon which Congress is required or reasonably expected to act; (2) it would contain a significant number and degree of provably false assertions of fact, and (3) the president could be proven to have known about the report and its contents and to have been aware of its essential falsity.

I will be watching the news over the coming months to see if a plausible example of this kind of presidential falsehood arises.  Suggestions from readers will be welcome.

***

In my next post, I will consider whether a president can constitutionally be impeached for unindictable, but pathological or pervasive, lying.

 

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Lying as an impeachable offense – PART I: Criminally indictable falsehoods

17 Thursday Aug 2017

Posted by impeachableoffenses in Uncategorized

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High Crimes and Misdemeanors, impeachment for lying, indictable falsehoods, indictable lies, lies, lying, perjury

Several weeks ago (before Charlottesville and the nuclear saber-rattling with North Korea) Mr. Trump claimed that the leader of the Boy Scouts of America called him to congratulate him on his, shall we say, unusual speech to the Boy Scout Jamboree.  He also claimed that the President of Mexico called him and discussed the supposed success of Trump’s border policies in deterring migrants.  Neither call happened, as the White House reluctantly, if obliquely, had to admit.  Though inconsequential in themselves, these incidents are examples of a persistent pattern that raises a critical question – can a president constitutionally be impeached for lying?

Mr. Trump has a highly idiosyncratic relationship with the truth.  Or, if one is inclined to plainer speaking, he lies.  A lot.

Reasons of state sometimes impose on government officials an obligation to lie in the national interest. Had a member of the press asked FDR on June 5, 1944, if the invasion of France was going to occur the following morning, and in Normandy, he would have been duty-bound to deny it.  To lie. But none of Mr. Trump’s manifold untruths fall into this category.

Nor is Mr. Trump’s mendacity merely an unusually pronounced example of the ordinary, if less laudable, disposition of all public figures to put a positive spin on awkward negative facts, or stretch positive facts somewhat farther than strict probity might dictate.

Nor are Mr. Trump’s fictions properly grouped with the occasional whoppers that politicians, eager for that little extra touch of authenticity, or pathos, or drama, sometimes blurt out in the midst of a speech or interview.  This is not Ronald Reagan’s famously false claim that he was present at the liberation of Nazi death camps, or Hillary Clinton’s more recent, but equally false, claim that she landed in Bosnia under sniper fire.

The simple fact is that Mr. Trump lies all the time.  Ceaselessly.  Unrepentantly.  About pretty much everything. Big things.  Little things.  Public matters and private ones.  The New York Times keeps a running count of his public falsehoods.  And while one can quibble with some of the items on the Times‘ list, no fairminded person can dispute the fact that Mr. Trump spouts untruths weekly, if not daily.

One might, I suppose, argue that Mr. Trump is so uninformed, so impulsive, so desperate for affirmation, so disconnected from ordinary reality that he isn’t “lying” because he merely speaks what he wishes were true and doesn’t subjectively realize, or care, that his imagined reality is not the world the rest of us experience.  That may be so — although that sort of speculation lies more in the realm of psychology than law or practical politics — and even if so, it has no relevance to how we as citizens are entitled to judge what a president says.   If a president consistently says things that are objectively untrue and does so either knowing that they are false or just not caring one way or the other, we are, I think, entitled to say he lies.  Indeed, we are entitled to conclude that he is a liar – in every sense of the word that has any meaning.

Which is all very well, but can a president constitutionally be impeached for lying, or for being a liar?

To address that question, we need a quick introduction to the constitutional standard for an impeachable offense — “high crimes and misdemeanors.”

A fast primer on “high crimes and misdemeanors”

Article II, Section 4, of the Constitution states that, “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

I will have numerous occasions in the coming weeks and months to dissect the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,” but let us begin with some basic points.

First, it is a mistake to think that there is some settled body of “law” out there that will tell us exactly what “high crimes and misdemeanors” means and that will, therefore, bind Congress if it decides to consider impeaching Mr. Trump.  Like so many other constitutional phrases, “high crimes and misdemeanors” is vague and open to differing interpretations.  But unlike most other constitutional language,  “high crimes and misdemeanors” is probably not subject to definitive interpretation by the Supreme Court. The question of whether some particular presidential misbehavior amounts to an impeachable “high crime” has so far in our history been left entirely to Congress, and it is almost certain that the Supreme Court would refuse to hear a president’s appeal from a congressional impeachment judgment.

Nonetheless, both scholars and Congress have assumed that the constitution’s language, its legislative history in the founding era, and the sparse precedents derivable from the fewer than two-dozen actual or near-impeachments of the last two centuries provide some guidance on what presidential behavior should and should not be deemed impeachable.  The usefulness of this handful of precedents is limited by the fact that most of them involved life-tenured federal judges as to whom many scholars believe different standards apply. Still, there is a high degree of consensus on at least some points:

  • The phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” includes many offenses that are actual crimes indictable under federal or state statutes.
  • Some indictable crimes are almost surely not impeachable offenses. Virtually all modern misdemeanor offenses — like driving under the influence or petty theft — and a good many low-level felonies — say counterfeiting a postage stamp or punching a “foreign official” in the nose — are surely not impeachable offenses.
  • The consensus view is that a president can be impeached for conduct that is not an indictable criminal offense.

As I argued at the time of the Clinton impeachment, the offenses, indictable or otherwise, most likely to be considered impeachable are: Very serious offenses that, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 65, are “of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL,” because they either (a) involve direct abuses of the president’s powers of office, or (b) though arguably private in character, are public in effect in that they deprive the president of the personal or political legitimacy necessary to the performance of his office.

Impeachable lies

It is easy to dismiss impeachment for lying as overheated fancy.  After all, everyone lies sometimes, and often for laudable reasons.  And, as noted above, persons in public life are particularly prone to occasional prevarication, whether out of public necessity or meaner calculations of personal or partisan advantage.  The overwhelming majority of falsehoods, whether pronounced by private citizens in private settings or public officials in public affairs, are neither criminally prosecutable, nor civilly actionable, nor grounds for removal from office high or low.

That said, it is also true that some lies do have legal consequences.  Indeed, it is indisputably true that certain kinds of presidential lies are impeachable offenses.  And there are additional types of presidential lie that have not, so far in our history, been the basis of an impeachment, but could plausibly become so.

So let us consider three broad categories of possibly impeachable lie – (1) criminally indictable falsehoods; (2) unindictable official falsehoods; and (3) unindictable, but pervasive or pathological, falsehoods.

I will address the first category in this post and turn to the second and third categories, and their relation to Mr. Trump’s peculiar case, in my next two posts.

Indictable falsehoods

Federal law makes a great many kinds of lies indictable felonies.  The most well-known category is perjury – knowingly telling a falsehood under oath — before a court, grand jury, or other official tribunal.  But it is also a felony to lie to virtually any federal agency so long as the subject matter of the lie is within the “jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States.”  So, for example, if Mr. Trump were to submit to an interview by the FBI in the Russian election interference investigation and tell a lie about a matter material to the investigation, that lie would be a felony, regardless of whether the statement was under oath.

Similarly, all sorts of unsworn lies told (or written) in commercial settings can be felonies.  All federal fraud statutes have as one element a false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise.

Many of these felonious lies would surely be grounds for impeachment. Two federal judges, Alcee Hastings and Walter Nixon, have been impeached for perjury.  In the case of a president, it seems plain that lying in the course of the Russia investigation, either under oath to a grand jury or in an unsworn statement to the FBI, would qualify as an impeachable offense. Such an indictable falsehood in a criminal investigation into foreign meddling in U.S. elections would be criminal, consequential, integral to the integrity of the presidential office, and thus squarely in the zone the founders would have considered impeachable.

But not all indictable lies are necessarily impeachable offenses.  The most notorious (though complicated) counter-example is President William J. Clinton.  On the one hand, the House of Representatives approved an article of impeachment charging that Mr. Clinton committed perjury in front of a grand jury by lying about his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky (and about previous allegedly perjurious testimony on the same subject in a civil lawsuit brought by Paula Jones).  On the other hand, the Senate found him not guilty of that charge by a vote of 45-55.

This result is confusing because, while the House vote signaled that grand jury perjury is an offense for which impeachment is possible, the Senate acquittal might be interpreted to mean: (1) that grand jury perjury is never an impeachable offense; (2) that grand jury perjury, if proven, is impeachable, but that the House failed to prove that Clinton committed perjury in the legal sense; or (3) that at least some Senators believed that some perjuries are impeachable and that Clinton committed perjury, but that this particular instance of perjury – lying about a private sexual affair in legal proceedings instituted as an elaborate political trap – should not be grounds for conviction and removal from the presidency.

There is a sea of analysis of the Clinton verdict, but the consensus is that: (a) perjury certainly can be an impeachable offense; (b) Clinton surely lied under oath and pretty certainly committed the crime of perjury; but (c) a majority of senators probably concluded that the peculiar circumstances of his case made this perjury unworthy of the drastic, politically destabilizing, remedy of removal of a president from office.

The Clinton case highlights several critical points that would be at issue in any effort to impeach Mr. Trump for lies that did not violate a criminal statute:

On the one hand, the Clinton precedent illustrates that not even lies told in the most solemn, legally consequential setting are necessarily impeachable.  What undoubtedly saved Mr. Clinton was that, even though his lies were told under oath in an official setting, their subject was an intimately private matter – adulterous sexual relations.  To elevate lies on such a subject to impeachable offenses required that Mr. Clinton’s accusers argue either that the adulterous sex itself rendered Mr. Clinton morally unfit for office, or that any lie under oath by a president is subversive of the rule of law generally and, more particularly, violates the president’s constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws will be faithfully executed.

Mr. Clinton’s accusers didn’t press the moral disqualification argument, at least explicitly, both because the overwhelming majority of the public no longer viewed the more pedestrian varieties of sexual infidelity as a disqualification from public office, and because a quite remarkable number of Mr. Clinton’s principle accusers were themselves confessed adulterers. Consequently, the Republican House members who argued the case in the Senate (the “managers”) contended that a president who lies under oath on any subject subverts the rule of law and fatally undermines both that critical norm of democratic governance and his own capacity to preside over the government.

Mr. Clinton’s acquittal ultimately rested, I think, on two points that would be central to a case for impeaching Mr. Trump for epidemic lying.

First, Clinton’s lies were about a private matter.  One can argue that the Lewinsky affair had a public aspect insofar as the sex was between two government employees (a president and an intern) and occurred on government property (the White House).  But that was always a stretch.

Second, Clinton’s lies occurred in the context of the Paula Jones civil lawsuit which (however meritorious on its facts) was quite unapologetically financed by Clinton’s political enemies in order to embarrass him, and later in a grand jury empaneled by independent counsel Kenneth Starr, whose pursuit of Clinton began with inquiries into Arkansas land deals and devolved into what many perceived as a sex-obsessed inquisition.  Clinton’s lies in these settings could be characterized as purely defensive — the squalid and inglorious, but perhaps understandable, response of a man cornered by opponents determined to ruin him politically by exposing his personal failings. Accordingly, the lies felt less like subversion of the rule of law and more like a tit-for-tat response to a misuse of the law for partisan political ends.

By contrast, Mr. Trump’s lies are not limited to private matters, or indeed to any particular subject. He prevaricates about matters as trivial as the size of the inaugural crowd on the Washington Mall to matters of great consequence such as the claim that the Obama administration “tapped” Trump Tower.  The key is, first,  that his lies are almost all about public matters, and second, that they are not the defensive falsehoods of a man maneuvered by his enemies into a perjury trap.  Rather, his lies are gleefully volunteered (often, one suspects, despite the best efforts of his family and handlers to shut him up) with the express intention of promoting his public political objectives.

Nonetheless, at least so far, we have no publicly available evidence that Mr. Trump has told an indictable lie since assuming office.  (The question of whether his various falsehoods in prior private life could amount to impeachable offenses is one for another day.) Therefore, we are left to inquire whether there is any precedent or plausible constitutional argument for basing a presidential impeachment on chronic, but unindictable, lying.

 

***

In my next post, I will address the possibility of impeaching a president for lies that are not criminally chargeable, but are part of formal presidential communications with congress.

 

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Frank O. Bowman, III


Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law
University of Missouri School of Law

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